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Abstract
This study asks how do changes in national political leaders’ (NPLs) discourse about the
European Union affect public support for the EU? To develop an answer to this question,
the research is situated in the tradition of discourse analysis, as it is better suited to
understand the nuances in the discourse being presented to the population. In the
literature reviewed for this project, EU-related discourse is presented as holding
particular power in affecting people’s perceptions of European issues due to the historical
low engagement and knowledge levels. The lack of a shared European public sphere and
international conversations on topics central to the EU leads to centering this project
around how national dynamics shape the support for European integration. To analyze
the correlation between political discourse and public support, this study adopts a
longitudinal single case study on Italy, selecting a variety of time frames and developing
an analysis of which messaging both majority and opposition leaders privilege. Public
support is measured through a selection of questions from time-sensitive Eurobarometers
— the commonly used source for measures of EU public support in much of the literature
on EU-related topics. After careful analysis based on the case study of Italy between
1990 and 2019, this project highlights the importance of discursive agreeance amongst
NPLs as a leading force in bolstering public support for the EU. In the final overview of
discursive trends, this research finds a particular shift in the overall underlying messaging
that relates Italy to the EU, with the latter now being presented as an obstacle to national
growth rather than an opportunity for greater economic and political integration. The
paper ends with an overview of the methodological limitations caused by external
constraints, and suggests that future research should apply this model to a cross-country
comparative case study to better gauge the actual value of political frames of discourse
and their effects on public support for the EU.
Riassunto
Questa tesi pone la questione in che modo i discorsi sull’Europa di leader politici
nazionali influenzano il supporto popolare per l’Unione Europea? Per formulare una
risposta a questa domanda, questo studio si presenta nel contesto della tradizione della
discourse analysis, un approccio migliore per capire le sottigliezze dei messaggi
presentati alla popolazione. Nella letteratura analizzata per questo progetto, i discorsi sul
tema dell’UE sono considerati particolarmente significativi per la loro abilità di
influenzare le percezioni popolari su temi europei a causa dei bassi livelli storici di
conoscenza ed ingaggiamento. La mancanza di una comune sfera pubblica europea e di
conversazioni internazionali sui temi centrali all’UE sono la ragione per cui questo
progetto preferisce analizzare le dinamiche nazionali che influenzano il supporto per
l’integrazione europea. Per analizzare la correlazione tra il discorso politico e il supporto
popolare, questo studio utilizza un singolo case study longitudinale, con la selezione di
certi periodi per capire che tipo di messaggi i leader della maggioranza e dell’opposizione
preferiscono. Il supporto pubblico viene misurato tramite domande dell’Eurobarometro
— lo strumento comunemente utilizzato per misurare supporto pubblico per l’UE in
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molta della letteratura su temi collegati all’UE. Dopo l’analisi basata sul case study
italiano fra il 1990 and il 2019, questo progetto evidenzia l’importanza dell’accordo
discorsivo tra LPN come una forza importante per influenzare il supporto pubblico per
l’UE. Nell’analisi finale dei trend, questo studio presenta un particolare cambiamento nel
sottotesto dei messaggi che collegano l’Italia e l’UE, con l’Unione ora presentata come
un ostacolo per la crescita nazionale invece che un'opportunità per migliore integrazione
economica e politica. Questo studio si conclude con una panoramica delle limitazioni
metodologiche causate da vincoli esterni, e suggerisce che la rcerca futura dovrebbe
applicare questo modello di ricerca ad un case study comparativo fra Paesi diversi per
meglio capire il valore effettivo delle strutture politiche discorsive e il loro effetto sul
supporto pubblico per l’UE.
Resumen
Este estudio plantea la siguiente pregunta: ¿Cómo afectan los cambios producidos en los
discursos de líderes políticos (NPL) el apoyo público para la Unión Europea? Para
responder esta pregunta, el estudio busca analizar el discurso presentado para entender
los matices ante la población. En la literatura revisada de este proyecto, los discursos
relacionados con la UE se presentan con cierto poder afectando la percepción de sus
oyentes hacia problemas europeos a través de la historia por falta de compromiso o
entendimiento por parte de los oyentes. La falta de estos en el público causa este proyecto
a enfocarse en cómo las dinámicas nacionales cambian a favor de la integración europea.
Para analizar la relación entre discurso político y apoyo público, este estudio analiza un
caso en Italia, seleccionando momentos precisos de discursos de líderes políticos
analizando la ventaja de la mayoría y la oposición. El apoyo público es medido mediante
preguntas en momentos precisos con Eurobarometros, la fuente común utilizada por la
UE para medir apoyo público en la literatura de temas relacionados con la Unión
Europea. Tras el análisis basado en el caso de Italia entre 1990 y 2019, este proyecto
destaca la importancia del acuerdo discursivo entre NPL como fuerza que lidera en apoyo
público para la UE. En la última visión general de las tendencias dircursivas, este estudio
encuentra un cambio particular en el mensaje total que relaciona Italia con la UE, siendo
el último mensaje el que presenta un obstáculo al crecimiento nacional en vez de una
oportunidad para una mejor integración política y económica. El estudio finaliza con la
revisión de las limitaciones metodológicas causadas por restricciones externas, sugiriendo
un futuro estudio que debe comparar este modelo entre diferentes países para un mejor
entendimiento del verdadero valor político que poseen los discursos para causar un efecto
en el apoyo público para la Unión Europea.
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Chapter I: Introduction
Political discourse is at the nexus of the study of political science, economics, and
history. Politicians and elites have long understood the power that their framing has on
influencing and swaying the perceptions of those in the polity - regardless of their status
as voters or citizens. In a democracy, any good and bad policy or political decision needs
to be accompanied by clear and successful political messaging to get non-elites on board
with the decisions being taken. Through political discourse, elites have the ability to
frame the past, present, and future, presenting relative histories to the public. While the
medium might change as new communication technologies arise, the centrality of
political discourse remains of critical importance.
The role of national political leaders (NPLs) in shaping public opinion has long
been a topic of research in Political Science. This project’s focus on the European Union
(EU) and national leaders investigates how political discourse has shaped and influenced
public support for the EU project during a period of increasing political, economic, and
cultural integration in the continent. The EU has undergone significant changes since its
creation in 1992, going from 12 member countries to the current 28, introducing a
common currency, surviving through the global financial crisis of 2010, dealing with
Brexit and the refugee crisis in the past decade. It is necessary to provide a longitudinal
overview of what has changed in how the EU is framed by political leaders and received
by the general public. The research question is as follows: how do changes in national
political leaders’ discourse about the European Union affect public support for the EU?
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The recent rise of Eurosceptic parties across Europe, paired with the
developments of the United Kingdom’s exit from the EU, calls for a long-term study of
political leaders’ discourse to understand how the public has been influenced in their
perceptions of the greater project of European integration that started right after World
War II. Given the lack of a common European public sphere (as discussed in the
following chapter), this research focuses solely on the role that NPLs have in shaping the
support of residents and citizens within their country — acknowledging the countrybased lens through which most of European politics is still carried out. To research the incountry effects of discourse and framing of the EU, this project’s analysis is based on a
single case study to allow for an in-depth understanding of the nuances of discourse and
the trends of support.
This research selects Italy as the prime case study for this new model of elite
cueing about the EU. Italy had been considered for a long time a leading supporter of any
form of further European integration, with the Italian public being incredibly supportive
of processes of economic, political, and cultural integration throughout the 1990’s and
early 2000’s. Nowadays, however, Italy is presented internationally as a critic of the EU,
both through its elected officials and its population. With recent electoral surges from
Eurosceptic parties like the Five Stars Movement and the League, and Italians growing
increasingly wary of the model of European integration, Italy presents an optimal first
case study to understand what might have caused that switch in popular support. The case
of Italy provides a particularly engaging research puzzle, as this research tries to explain
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what caused the major shift among Italians towards supporting the project of European
integration.
This research project develops as follows. In Chapter II, the literature on the
topics of both elite cueing and EU public support is analyzed. The chapter covers both
historical and contemporary understandings of political discourse in general and in the
specific case of the EU, analyzing how a lack of a shared European public sphere has
allowed NPLs to be the main influencers of public support within the borders of their
own country. The chapter highlights the forms that public support for the EU take on, and
how they can be manipulated by political leaders. The chapter builds upon the academic
research to affirm that the European masses seek simple understandings for the
complicated integrated systems of governance of the EU, and it is NPLs that provide that
clear messaging and influence public perceptions directly.
Chapter III sets up the methodological approach for this study. It starts by
justifying the methodological choices made for the longitudinal case study, and then
conceptualizes and operationalizes both the independent and the dependent variables. The
following section introduces the categories of analysis for both the discourse and the
public support. Adapting from Pirro and van Kessel (2012), this chapter introduces the
breakdown of the political, economic, and identity-cultural categories utilized for the
research. The chapter continues with a breakdown of the time frames chosen for the
analysis, and concludes with the introduction of Italy as the case study selected for this
research project.
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Chapter IV develops the analysis of NPLs’ discourse and its correlation with
public support for the EU in each of the time frames according to the methodology
described in Chapter III. Specific sections are dedicated to each time frame, and the
discourse analysis for leaders in that period is carried out before utilizing the
Eurobarometer data to measure public support. The chapter highlights discursive changes
in the last two time frames analyzed, with drastic negative effects for public support for
the EU.
The final chapter provides an overview of the results coming out of the analysis of
Chapter IV, and provides answers to whether or not the initial hypothesis proved to be
true. This overview highlights that while seeking an answer to the original research
question, the most significant finding is that public support remains positive and wellabove average only when both NPLs in a certain time frame are both using positive
messaging in the economic, political, and identity-cultural discourse categories. The
chapter also provides a series of considerations over the methodological limitations that
might have affected the results of the study. The closing section suggests options and
possibilities for future research that could stem from this initial study.
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Chapter II: Analyzing the Literature on European Union Discourse
Introduction
While some research in the field of European Union (EU) politics has explored the
connections and influences between elites and mass opinions on the EU (Gabel and
Scheve 2007; Steenbergen et al. 2007; Vossing 2015), there is a significant lack of
research on how the changing dynamics of political leadership in Europe affect public
support for European integration. This chapter combines literature on elite political
discourse together with EU-specific trends regarding the mediated relationship between
masses and elites. There is a need to investigate the role that national political leaders
(NPLs) play in commanding the public’s feelings about the European experiment in the
long run. Understanding public sentiments about the EU requires a political and historical
analysis of the importance and the changes in political leaders’ discourse throughout the
development of European integration. Overall, the chapter analyzes how national political
leaders were able to shift the public opinion on the EU by engaging with mostly lowknowledge and disengaged citizen-voters, creating a shared enemy to support populist
blame-shifting tactics.
This chapter starts by situating this study’s research in the context of political
discourse analysis (PDA), to understand the importance of analyzing the language of
political leaders. The focus then shifts on political leaders’ discourse effects on public
perceptions; theoretical understandings of EU-specific discourse are then introduced. The
next section provides an overview of the literature on the changes in political leaders’
discourse since the 1992 creation of the EU. The chapter continues by deconstructing the
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mediated connection between elites and masses, as well as the concept of public sphere in
EU discourse. The focus finally lands on public support for European integration and its
changes in relation to political leaders’ discourse.
Talking About It: The Value of Political Elites
The latter part of the 20th century saw a linguistic turn in the study of political science,
which paralleled a similar political turn in the study of linguistics (Dunmire 2012).
Political scientists moved towards the study of language as an inherently political area of
expression, one that affects the daily lives and long-term plans of political leaders and
citizens alike, rather than simply a tool to get a message across (van Djik 2004). The role
of language in politics is clearly not something that received recognition only in the 20th
century, as philosophers like Aristotle and Cicero already understood the importance of
political rhetoric in ancient Greece (Dunmire 2012). What shifted in the 20th century was
a growing focus on the political content and context of discourse; rather than focusing on
the proper ways of political speech like the Greeks, modern political scientists started to
explore the power dynamics at play in political discourse, giving value to the causes and
effects of certain ways of speech (Wilson 2004).
Modern political science research on speech and discourse has been
contextualized within the field of political discourse analysis (PDA), in which language
truly came to be understood as a political phenomenon. This new perspective allowed
academics to examine the creation of meaning that is fundamental in the political activity
of any individual or group: shared understandings of reality and common values are
therefore created over a conflict of meaning, one that is a constant at any level of political
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activity (Kiratli 2016; Dunmire 2012). PDA is tasked with “critiquing the role discourse
plays in producing, maintaining, abusing and resisting power in contemporary society”
(Dunmire 2012, 736). While recognizing that the political includes a variety of activities
and actors in the polity, including professional politicians, political institutions, and
active citizens, Teun van Djik advocates for a focus on the “discourse produced by the
central players in the polity” (738). Specific forms of discourse are themselves a
manifestation of power: political leaders have the ability to access and exert control over
public discourse in ways that are not possible for common citizens (van Djik 2004).
When this strategy is contextualized within the EU sphere, national political leaders have
obtained and maintained the ability to shape the discourse on European integration, and
their positions are the ones that are then received by the public.
The literature on the power of political elites offers a variety of models and
theories on the relationship between elites and masses. Most models explain the effects of
cueing, the linkages in knowledge and behavior that are created between the base and the
political leaders. According to the literature, elites more strongly influence perceptions
and voting behaviors of the masses than the public can sway the positions of their elected
leaders (Gabel and Scheve 2007; Steenberg et al. 2007; Sanders and Toka 2013). While
the wider world of political science academia still carries a debate on the directionality of
effects between elites and masses, authors on EU issues have made it clear that elite
influences on public perceptions are much stronger than public influences on elite
discourse or behavior. European political elites generally do not consider the average
opinion when determining their positions, but the public often employs cognitive
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shortcuts to create their own opinion on relatively unfamiliar topics, and such knowledge
paths are presented by trusted sources like party leaders (Sanders and Toka 2013, 23).
Since the EU is perceived as a distant, overly complicated, and somewhat
undemocratic political and economic project, the opinions of elites become fundamental
in creating public understandings of European integration. Most importantly, as
Konstantin Vossing (2015) argues, political elites have the ability to change public
opinion at a level beyond that which we would expect from evolving social identities and
changing economic factors. In the context of EU discourse, these effects are considered
to be particularly prominent. The EU appears as a distant technocratic institution whose
inner workings are hard to understand even to informed citizens with high levels of
political knowledge. Because of the perception of the lack of impact of EU policies and
politics in the everyday lives of European citizens, national political elites cue those
within their realm of activity by providing a model to understand and perceive the Union
through national lenses. Rather than being a negatively-charged manipulation of public
perceptions coming from elites, this top-down understanding of EU support recognizes
that citizens expect their political leaders to be the ones providing the necessary
information to allow them to form their opinion on technical topics like European
integration (Steenbergen et al. 2007). In this model, we recognize the incredible
importance of political leaders, especially those at the top of their respective parties:
when the short- and long-term party lines are established, those will have a significant
effect on public perceptions and support. While the literature covers the importance of
political leaders’ discourse and it recognizes their ability to sway public perceptions
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(Sanders and Toka 2012; Vossing 2015), it lacks an analysis of how the changes in
discourse have affected and are affecting citizens in the national political sphere.
Historical Roots and Ideas on European Discourse
The elite discourse on the EU is bound to change continuously as the institution itself
changes over time. Political leaders are able to use the changing institutional environment
to push their cues forward. To understand how public support for the EU changed, we
turn to an analysis of EU national political leaders’ discourse, focusing this section on the
varying volume of integration discourse. Political leaders in 1992, at the time when the
Union only had its 12 original members, presented ideas of Europe that were framed
differently than those presented in 2019; for example, as the EU expanded its
membership to Eastern European states in the early 2000s, it challenged the boundaries of
the perceived “Europe” for the national publics (Herranz-Surralles 2012). Compared to
the early years of the European project, when elite discourse on European integration was
limited, NPLs have now no choice but to present some form of discourse on the Union
due to the increasing involvement of the EU in the economic and political happenings at
the country level. The following two sections provide a historical analysis of the
changing volumes and focuses of political leaders’ discourse before and after the 1992
Maastricht Treaty and into the present days.
Discourse on Europe and European unity predates the 1992 Maastricht Treaty that
formally established the EU. Ever since the end of World War II, political leaders across
the war-torn continent recognized and promoted the need for a united Europe as a foreign
policy solution to both dependency from the US and to detachment from the Soviet
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Union. The creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952 and the
European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 represented an elitist push for integration
among European countries, a movement that mostly focused on the economic interests of
large national industries and was therefore not of much interest to the average citizen.
The period from the late 1960s to the early 1990s is of crucial interest to the literature on
support for European integration as it is commonly highlighted as the era of “permissive
consensus.” In this period, elites were forging an ever-increasing European integration
while the public was mostly uninterested and not participating in this political process.
The inner workings that established the EU were under an inscrutable technocratic cover
that shielded interest from outsiders (Della Porta and Caiani 2006; Sanders and Toka
2013).
The breaking point for the permissive consensus, according to the literature,
happened in 1992 with the signing and following ratification of the Maastricht Treaty that
established the EU as it is known today. The Treaty moved Europe towards stronger
economic integration, but also moved beyond it for the first time, integrating aspects of
social, foreign, and security policy (Bickerton et al. 2015). The ratification of the Treaty
proved to be tricky in Denmark and France, leading to an increase in the political elite
debate on the topic of European integration. The French ratified the Treaty with only
51% of positive votes in the referendum, in what came to be known as the petite oui, the
“small yes” that pushed the ratification through.
The Maastricht Treaty was pushed by political elites with often strong wording;
Andre Szasz, leader of the Dutch central bank at the time, said “If we do not grasp this
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opportunity there may not be another one;” German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, the
statesman who led Germany through the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Berlin
Wall, and the unification of Germany, highlighted that a failure to find common ground
on this Treaty could mean “the beginning of the collapse of our Community” (Baun
1995, 620). European political elites put their unwavering support behind the creation and
ratification of the Treaty, but for the first time the public was able to express themselves
on the proceedings of European integration. When the Danish people voted against the
ratification in the first round, Danish political elites were in shock: the Parliament had
overwhelmingly supported the ratification with 130 members voting for and 25 voting
against the bill. The popular referendum, however, opposed the ratification by a narrow
margin, with 50.7% voting against it and 49.3% for it (Svenaai 1994). The Danish case
was peculiar to Denmark, especially because the ruling government at the time was
experiencing high levels of unpopularity and the minor “fringe” party leaders on the left
and right managed to push voters with lower political knowledge and engagement to go
to the polls and express their dislike for the government by opposing the proposition
(Franklin et al. 2007). These leaders were able to frame the Treaty as a dangerous step
towards loss of sovereignty and the creation of a relationship with Germany that was still
considered impossible by the older generations who had lived through World War II
(Marti Font 1992).
The Danish case was one that was particularly influenced by the ability of
minority parties to swing those voters that were not being engaged by the mainstream
majority sectors: the far left and far right leaders had a fertile ground of action and a
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crowd that would listen to them, while the mainstream political leaders expected that
their workings and predictions did not require explanations or justification. While the
Danish did eventually ratify the Maastricht Treaty (a year later and with opt-out options
crafted solely for Denmark), the event sent political ripples across the EU, with new
political movements harboring anti-EU sentiments and crafting new strategies to create
and engage the population of voters that had long been left out of the elitist conversation
on the how and when of European integration. Understanding the political and historical
significance of the Maastricht Treaty allows us to pinpoint the early stages of the
changing elite discourse on the EU, going from elitist shadows to the public spotlight.
The Contemporary Changing Landscape: Populist & Eurosceptic Parties
In the analysis of the changing landscape of political discourse about the EU, a more
recent phenomenon that requires contextualization is how leaders of populist and
Eurosceptic parties have changed the discursive paradigms that were previously analyzed
(Borriello and Mazzolini 2019). Populist parties have made significant progress in
national elections across the Union, and they often provide a strongly Eurosceptic
framework for discourse (Pirro and van Kessel 2018). These parties exist across the
political spectrum, with leftist parties like Podemos in Spain, right-wingers like
Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in Germany, and post-ideological movements like the
5 Stars Movement (M5S) in Italy. While the leaders of these movements and parties offer
different perspectives, they share a common presentation of the EU as the “ultimate elitist
project,” inherently undemocratic and working against the people of Europe (Pirro and
van Kessel 2018; Borriello and Mazzolini 2019). Populist discourse is presented as a
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counter-hegemonic practice, that seeks to create an antagonist figure to the political and
financial elites at the EU level. This antagonization is presented by Borriello and
Mazzolini (2019) in their study on the use of metaphors among populist political leaders
in Spain and Italy: both Podemos and M5S leaders present the elite/people relation as one
of battle and war. The discourse of populist parties is then inherently violent as it aims at
amplifying the enemy characterization of the EU in the eyes of their supporters.
Eurosceptic populist discourse represents a breaking point from what mainstream
political leaders have been saying in the past 20 years. Eurosceptics’ discourse is often
targeted at the EU as a whole rather than at specific issues of policy. While mainstream
governing parties tend to use their elected members in the European Parliament (EP) to
lead the conversation about EU issues, populist parties tend to frame issues on a
nationalist level — therefore letting their national leaders control the anti-EU discourse
(Seeninger and Wagner 2015). On the topic of framing, the experiences change
depending on the ideological background of the party: right-wing eurosceptics prefer to
use cultural frames, highlighting issues of integration of migrants, security threats
connected to refugees, and ideas like “the Christian roots of Europe”; left-leaning
populist parties, on the other hand, tend to prefer the use of socio-economic framing,
covering topics regarding economic and financial sovereignty and the dangers of the
Eurozone (Pirro and van Kessel 2018, 329-330). With their new approaches to populist
discourse, anti-EU political leaders were able to engage with the citizen-voters who felt
left out of the conversations on the ever-growing European integration process.
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Bridging Elite Messaging and Mass Minds
After considering the historical and recent changes of political discourse about the EU,
this paper turns its attention to understanding the ways in which political communication
makes its way into the ears and minds of citizens-voters. For masses to be influenced by
political elites, it requires efficient and successful communication from the political
leaders (Sanders and Toka 2012). While some research has focused on governmental
communication (Heinze et al. 2013), there needs to be a focus on political actors outside
of the executive cabinet, especially as populist parties work on parliamentary opposition
to work towards their own government. Traditionally, political messaging from leaders
had to mediated through news media, either in print, radio, or television. While some
experiments have been done in local governance to connect politicians directly with their
constituents, allowing for more fluid and direct interactions (Jensen 2003), most political
messaging requires the intervention of media. Voters tend to gravitate towards familiar
forms of media when seeking information on governmental developments and political
updates (Heinze et al. 2013), which expose citizens to a variety of positions on different
topics, often setting up conversations as inherently conflictual.
While traditional media is often a target for attacks of anti-EU populist parties,
they also get to benefit from the system they are criticizing. TV media’s hyper-focus on
political skirmishes and its tendency to highlight bold political personalities over modest
policy talk has led to an increased presence of populist political leaders on political talk
shows, regardless of their polling numbers or seats in parliament (Mazzoleni and
Bracciale 2018). What these political actors were also able to obtain was a successful
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communication strategy through online social networks. The ubiquity and ease of access
of social media has fundamentally changed the way in which political leaders talk to their
“followers.” Political communication now escapes the filters of traditional media
conglomerates and aims at the virality of the messages being shared (Engesser et al.
2017). With social media’s interest in highly engaging content, political leaders have to
shift their discourse towards highly emotional, controversial, and sometimes even violent
ways that can stimulate responses from their own electorate and those opposite of them
(Mazzoleni and Bracciale 2018).
The European Public Sphere: The Missing Link
A theme that must be addressed to frame popular support for the EU is that of the lack of
a European public sphere. The public sphere is to be understood as the “context in which
private citizens engage in a public discourse about questions of the common good” (Bee
2008, 258). In the case of the EU, this context is considered to be non-existent because of
the lack of cross-border interaction and the nationalization of media coverage of EU
affairs. An analysis of the European public sphere is necessary to understand the
importance of political leaders in shaping narratives on the EU. Due to the lack of crossnational conversations on topics salient to European integration, citizen-voters can only
turn to their own national political actors for engagement in EU politics.
Traditional media is one of the driving forces behind how the public sphere is
shaped and what content is even brought into discussion, but national newspapers and TV
stations often fail to talk about the EU in a strictly EU context. Media actors tend to
frame EU issues from a narrow national perspective, focusing on the positions and
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concerns of those within the polity rather than covering a set of cross-border opinions and
different political leaders (Dutceac Segesten and Bossetta 2019). In order for a European
public sphere to emerge, media discourse must be Europeanized to a certain degree: the
scope of public discourse must expand beyond national borders and prominently feature
politicians and events from across Europe. Once that process gains traction, European
citizens are given the opportunity to discuss and to create cross-national interactions
based on that shared knowledge of events and actors at play.
A segmented public discourse about Europe fosters widening gaps between
national identities rather than promoting a shared European one. According to Ruth
Wodak and Gilbert Weiss (2005), two of the leading researchers on EU discourse
analysis, there will never be a uniform and cohesive elite discourse on the EU, which in
turn will maintain a variety of local, regional, and national understandings of what a
European identity is and could be. The absence of a public discussion about the
institutions of the Union is considered to be a leading cause behind the perception of the
EU’s “democratic deficit.” In its current state and for its whole political life, the
institutional structure of the EU has never been part of the open arena of public discourse,
which is considered to be a strikingly important precondition to legitimization (Della
Porta and Caiani 2006). While national actors and institutions are under constant scrutiny
from the public and are central parts of media discourse, European institutions are left at
the periphery of the public sphere, unable to be scrutinized and legitimized by the
European citizens that they are meant to serve. A study by Anamaria Dutceac Segesten
and Michael Bossetta (2019) showed that the rise of Eurosceptic parties has facilitated
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the Europeanization of media and popular discourse: when covering Eurosceptic parties,
traditional media frames them in the context of a broader European discourse, with an
increase in mentions of supranational institutions, policies, and processes. The lack of a
European public sphere strongly situates NPLs as the central engine of creation for EU
discourse, while only being exposed to scrutiny and engagement from their own
electorates and citizens.
Changes in Public Support
Public support for the EU and European integration has been a constant subject of
research before and after Maastricht (Anderson and Hecht 2018). The variables that can
influence an individual’s level of support for the EU are almost countless, and they have
fostered a variety of approaches to evaluating public support. The average European
citizen does not have a particularly articulated vision of the Union, leading to general
feelings of support rather than an institution- or policy-specific evaluations. The
preference for European integration is based on a few common core items around which
the rest of the perceptions are built: as long as the overall perception is that the benefits of
membership outweigh the costs, the support will stay significantly positive (Anderson
and Hect 2018). Practically speaking, it is unlikely that a citizen that holds a strong belief
in favor of the European Parliament will not support European economic policies or the
monetary union.
This simplifying tendency in the approach towards EU support was exacerbated
during the 2008 financial crisis that reached Europe and the following experience of
Greece. The media discourse — especially in Southern Europe — pushed the image of
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the Troika, the political triumvirate formed by the European Commission, the European
Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. This set of supranational institutions
came to represent everything that the Union did, and it quickly drew the opposition of
many citizens across the continent. The Troika provided controversial bailouts to Greece
to avoid insolvency on state bonds and external debts, but it did so by imposing
incredibly strict economic policies that the national government had no choice but to
accept, leading to cost-cutting measure that depleted public health, education, and
pensions. The actions of the Troika were portrayed by anti-EU political leaders as the
perfect example of the over-imposing powers of the Union, and this simple imagery
easily struck a chord with European citizens in countries like Spain, Cyprus, Ireland, and
Italy that were all being hit the hardest by the economic crisis. By 2008 for example, only
37% of Italians considered EU membership to be “a good thing,” compared to the 60%
and over before 2001, and only 23% said that they trusted European institutions
(Lucarelli 2015).
The 2008-2010 crisis had a strong effect on how the public perceived the EU: the
crisis itself did not spark populist or Eurosceptic feelings, but those were strongly
influenced by how the EU — in the form of the Troika — dealt with the situation. When
European citizens were called to the ballots in 2014 for new elections for the European
Parliament, they did not treat it as a second-order national contest as EP elections are
usually considered, but they cast a vote that was truly aimed at sharing their perspective
on pan-Europeanism and the greater European project of integration (Hobolt and de Vries
2016). The next section explores this concept of the political leaders’ preference for
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localization of European issues over a genuine EU-level debate on EU-level issues and
topics.
The Electoral Horse Race and Information Exposure
The 2014 EP election cycle allows for an interesting case in the analysis of the interplay
between political leaders’ discourse, media framing, political knowledge, and public
reception to EU communication. To increase the democratic participation in EU electoral
processes, the EP introduced the Spritzenkandidaten concept, which required each of the
main EP political groups to bring forward a candidate’s name for the position of
President of the European Commission — the highest seat of power in the Union.
Research from Katjana Gattermann, Claes De Vreese, and Wouter van der Brug (2016)
showcased the lack of European-level political discourse even with the introduction of
the Spitzenkandidaten. Coverage of EP elections is one of the very few topics in EU
politics that gets addressed by news media, but even then it is dominated by domestic
political actors (De Vreese et al. 2006).
One of the core issues is that European citizens at the ballot do not cast their
preference for the Europarties themselves, they do so for their national parties they are
already connected to. NPLs treat EP elections as second-rate tests of their appeal among
the national public, leading them to maintain a low information level for EU issues while
focusing on party politics and constructs of Europe that further their national agendas
(Clarks and Hellwig 2012). In 2014, according to the data presented by Gatterman et al.
(2016), only 16% of their survey respondents were able to make a meaningful assessment
of the candidates brought forward by the three major Europarties, which signals a failure
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of connection between high-level EU politics and mass perceptions. Low levels of
information about the EU have been shown to hold a correlation with distorted popular
attitudes that lean negatively towards European integration. Political leaders, especially
those who hold anti-EU positions and ideologies, then have a vested interest in
maintaining information levels low to improve the strength of their cues, especially
because high-knowledge sections of the public are less susceptible to Eurosceptic frames
(Clark and Hellwig 2012). Understanding the centrality of political leaders in the context
of the national media apparatus carries significance as we consider that the majority of
European citizens acquire and seek knowledge on the EU through traditional media like
television and the written press, according to data from the Standard Eurobarometer 88.
Linking National Political Leaders’ Discourse & Public Support for the EU
This chapter has developed understandings of both the role of political leaders’ discourse
and public support on the topic of support for European integration. Support for the EU is
clearly a complicated and layered issue, whose development is varying based on both
cultural and political context. The role of political leadership is then to embrace those
different factors at play in the national sphere of politics and to implement and value
discourse that is valuable for the people it is aimed at. While the institutions of the EU try
to develop a common understanding of European identity and commonalities, the absence
of a common European discourse at the European level is a core theme in the literature
we presented (Wodak and Weiss 2005; Borriello 2017; Borriello and Mazzolini 2019).
National political leaders work strictly in the context of their country: European issues
are presented through an Italian, Spanish, French, or German lens rather than through a
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supranational one. As long as these leaders benefit from localizing their discourse, their
citizens will lack a common understanding of what the European integration project
should look like at a Union level. Gaps between public support for the EU are bound to
emerge as national political leaders approach EU issues outside of a shared European
public sphere (Bee et al. 2008).
The power that national political leaders hold in shaping EU discourse and
support is not to be underestimated. While the current research on political cueing still
has to come to a common ground on the directionality between elites and masses, the
literature reviewed in this chapter strongly highlights the importance of elite effects on
masses (Baun 1995; Gabel and Scheve 2007; Steenbergen and Edwards 2007; Vossing
2015). The European public seeks simple understandings of the complex EU system, and
those cognitive and political shortcuts are offered by the elites they are represented by.
Factoring in the lack of a European public sphere where citizens could interact across
borders and develop a common understanding of Europeanness, elite-masses connections
come into the foreground for this research (Della Porta and Caiani 2006; Bee at al. 2008).
The literature also points us to the value of the mediation of political elites’ messages,
understanding how Eurosceptic leaders are able to exploit traditional media’s interest in
heightened conflict as well as social media’s algorithms that privilege interactions and
virality (Engesser et al. 2017; Mazzoleni and Bracciale 2018).
Overall, the literature reviewed for this chapter showcases how low the public’s
engagement with EU issues has been, and even when those are brought into the public
discussion, political leaders do so from national perspectives, which in turn get reflected
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in the media coverage of the topic at hand. In the multi-level governance system of the
EU, the Union itself has become an easy target for blame-shifting coming from national
political leaders — even those holding high offices like that of Prime Minister (Traber et.
al 2019). When the EU is brought into the political conversation, it is to present a higher
political power that is putting unbearable constraints on the power and autonomy of
national governments and their people. As the chapter has covered, the reception of these
messages from the perspective of low-knowledge and generally disengaged masses has
brewed strong anti-EU sentiments in many European countries across a variety of voting
groups.
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Chapter III: Methodology
Introduction
This chapter covers the methods of the study for the following research question: how do
changes in national political leaders’ (NPLs) discourse about the European Union affect
public support for the EU? Therefore, the hypotheses are as follows:
•

H : if national political leaders’ discourse about the EU turns negative then public
1

support for the EU will decline in those leaders’ country.
•

H : if national political leaders’ discourse about the EU turns positive then public
2

support for the EU will increase in those leaders’ country.
Figure III.1: Arrow Diagram

The chapter starts by understanding the methodology selected for this research. It
then moves on to analyzing the background for the selection of National Political Leaders
(NPLs) and their discourse as the independent variable of the analysis. Qualitative
measurements for NPLs’ discourse are then set up. The next section is dedicated to
exploring public support for the EU as the dependent variable, followed by its appropriate
measurement. The chapter then sets the time frames used for the comparative analysis.
The chapter ends with setting up the country of Italy as the case study selected for this
specific research.
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Methodology
This study is based on a single case study which allows for internal comparisons between
time to better analyze the changes in the discourse of NPLs and how those have affected
the public support for the EU. This research design based on discourse analysis and
survey data allows for an in-depth analysis of the effects of elite-mass cueing in the
context of the wider European integration project. A time-based case study allows for
comparison between each of the time frames taken into consideration while also bringing
significant trends to the forefront of the analysis that would have otherwise been lost
through a traditional single case study. While the case study is focused solely on one
country in the EU, it provides opportunities for external validity and generalization of the
findings to similarly structured countries across the Union, which will be explored in a
later section of this chapter.
Independent Variable
National Political Leaders
The unit of analysis for the independent variable is at the individual level. The focus is
the discourse produced by national political leaders (NPLs). Due to the recurrent focus on
political leaders in discourse analysis (Dunmire 2012; Borriello 2017; Borriello and
Mazzolini 2019), this research seeks to analyze individual leaders and their nuanced
approaches in common political contexts. Political leaders in the EU represent a variety
of party and ideological interests and are considered particularly powerful in setting
public understandings on the topic of Europe (Baun 1995). Political leaders are the actors
through which elite-mass cueing processes are reified in the political arena (Gabel and
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Scheve 2007). For this research, the specific focus is on leaders that are part of the
national political system. This specificity is due to the power of NPLs to shape the
national discourse to which the public is exposed. Political and media structures in
European countries give discursive power to NPLs rather than to Members of the
European Parliament (MEPs) or political leaders from other countries (van Djik 2004;
Steenbergen et al. 2007; Sanders and Toka 2012; Vossing 2015).
Leaders’ selection is done by choosing significant time frames in the modern
history of the EU and selecting specific NPLs in that interval. The time frame selection is
explained in a later section. For this research, NPLs of the country being studied include
the Head of Government, as well as one or two opposition leaders. Heads of Government
are often the central focus in the national public sphere, and analyzing their discursive
changes is significant in understanding the ideas to which large parts of the populations
are exposed. Including at least one opposition leader is necessary, and a second one might
be added depending on the context of the time frame in question. A second opposition
leader should be taken into consideration if their discourse is significantly different from
that of the first opposition NPL selected or there was a change in leadership during the
time frame in consideration. The value of including the discourse of opposition leaders is
tied to the multi-party parliamentary system typical of European countries. The historical
variety of ideologies and parties is reflected in a diversity of discursive themes that are
allowed to be presented in the political arena. Reflecting on the discursive changes of
opposition leaders allows for a better understanding of which type of discourse becomes
effective enough to move from the political periphery into the mainstream. While some
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ideas of Europe might be constantly relegated to small minority parties that are
considered extremist, some previously radical ideas can become normalized and reach
mainstream status.
Discourse
For the purpose of this research, discourse is defined as the cohesive ensemble of ideas,
concepts, and categorizations about a certain topic as framed and presented by NPLs.
This general definition allows for the recognition of the variety of ways in which
discourse is articulated by political leaders. Discourse is the fundamental reifying process
of political thought, and a proper analysis requires contextual value. Images of the EU are
created and projected through NPLs’ discourse and its connection to the frames received
by the population at large. Following the canon of discourse analysis employed by
scholars such as Kaiser and Kleinen-von Königslöw (2017) and Borriello (2017), this
study utilizes a qualitative analysis of the frames and images used by the political elites
under scrutiny, arguing in favor of a more holistic approach to the analysis of discourse.
NPLs’ discourse is the cohesive ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations
about the EU as framed and presented by NPLs. Discourse encompasses all verbal and
written production by NPLs through media like parliamentary addresses, interviews,
political rallies, and social media posts. Discourse analysis then aims at deconstructing
and analyzing the messages and frames that are utilized regularly by — in this case —
NPLs in order to create a certain set of images of Europe that can be then transmitted to
the public. Deploying the discourse analysis framework allows to uncover the beliefs and
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values presented by each NPL over the time frames taken into consideration for this
comparative case study.
The significant time frame that is considered for this study presents particular
methodological challenges. While PMs have a consistent presence in front of the
Parliament and in the press, opposition leaders are often working as extra-parliamentary
individuals, and even when they sit in parliament, that is often not where they push most
of their discursive opposition. Limiting the research to the analysis of parliamentary
speeches would not give a full overview of the discourse presented by NPLs, especially
those at the opposition who seek extra-parliamentary avenues to let their discourse reach
their potential electorate.
Over the years, the ways in which NPLs can reach their electorates have changed
dramatically. While the printed press represented the main mode of communication in the
early 1990s, current-days' NPLs often employ their social media channels to quickly
share influential inputs on many topics, including the EU. In understanding that different
ways to share discourse have been employed in the almost 30 years overviewed in this
study, as well as assuming that NPLs use a variety of channels depending on whether
they are in the governmental majority or at the opposition, the corpus collected for the
analysis of discourse requires a combination of parliamentary addresses, newspaper and
magazine interviews, as well as social media posts when applicable - similarly to
Borriello and Mazzollini (2019). While their analysis focuses on counter-hegemonic
discourse across Spain and Italy, their methodology and choice of content still applies to
this study. This research strategy, which includes the analysis of content from a wide
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variety of sources, allows for a comparative analysis both between leaders in a specific
period and across time frames. Reducing the field of content analyzed would not allow
for a proper evaluation of recurring frames of discourse for the NPLs.
While the components that make up the corpus analyzed for each NPL might be
different, they all contribute to creating the broad discourse whose qualitative analysis
will follow in the chapter. For each leader being analyzed, the source material involves
parliamentary addresses and newspaper interviews. These are highly public and thoughtout avenues for NPLs to construct their discourse, and their analysis can uncover the
specific frames that are being discussed. Parliamentary addresses are particularly useful
in capturing the programmatic nature of leaders’ discourse on Europe, highlighting what
the EU should look like and what role should their country play within that context.
Parliamentary addresses provide a more formal context to the discourse, providing a
strong base for analysis. Parliamentary addresses can be gathered from the country’s
Parliament website and archives. Newspaper interviews provide a more direct and
potentially less structured look into the discourse of NPLs. The mass nature of these
interviews provides useful insight into what NPLs want to mostly directly communicate
to their electorates. These interviews can be found by researching the leader’s name
during a certain time frame on the country’s mainstream newspapers.
Measures
The discourse analysis is based on a set of recurring frames and positionalities within
those frames. The methodology is based on an adaptation of Pirro and Van Kessel (2018).
A holistic approach to the analysis of these frames allows for gauging which frames are
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consistently used by NPLs and how their discourse plays within those specific frames.
The questions that NPLs’ discourse on the EU try to provide answers to are many and
nuanced: what is the EU right now? What should the EU be? Is there significance to the
European project? What is the role of their country in the greater European project? How
has the EU wronged/benefited the country’s citizens? These sections help in guiding the
analysis of the most important messages included in the parliamentary addresses and
interviews. The answers to these questions can be categorized into three different
sections. Guidelines for recognizing positive and negative discourse are based on the
context of three frames, modified and adapted from Pirro and Van Kessel (2018):
identity-cultural, economic, and political frames. In this research, the NPLs’ discourse is
categorized within these three discursive frames to understand how NPLs present images
of the EU to their potential electorate.
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Table III.1:Frames and categorization for the analysis of NPLs’ EU discourse
Economic

Identity-Cultural

Political

A common union
with the euro as the
single currency is the
best option for
national economic
growth and easier
trade across borders.

Multiculturalism and diversity of
the EU is a strength that should
be recognized. Membership in
the EU allows member-countries
to recognize their shared cultural
identities. (Country) belongs in
the wider context of European
identity.

The EU project has
brought peace thanks to
its supranational system
of democracy, with
elected and appointed
officials.

Negative A common union
with the euro as the
single currency hurts
national economies
and puts unnecessary
financial restraints
over individual
members.

The historical roots of Europe
are in Christianity, and that
cultural frame has to be
preserved at all costs. The EU
project erases national identity in
favor of a neutral one.

Relinquishing any
national decisionmaking power to the
EU is wrong, and the
institutional system of
the Union is
fundamentally
undemocratic.

Positive

. Modified from Pirro & Van Kessel (2018).
Firstly, the analysis focuses on how different NPLs utilize each type of frame, in
order to understand which discursive strategies are preferred by either government or
opposition leaders in each of the time frames being analyzed. Secondly, the analysis turns
to how NPLs position themselves and their discourse within those specific frames that are
being deployed, in order to understand how extreme or moderate positions arise within
each type of frame. A qualitative approach to the analysis of frames and images used by
NPLs requires a thorough reading of the source material in the original language, to
maintain an understanding of the nuances of the discourse. Once the first collection of all
the material is completed, the discourse is categorized, and samples of salient parts of the
discourse are selected — translated into English — and analyzed within the context of the
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individual NPL and in comparison with the other leader in the same time frame. While
ideal long-term research would allow for a set of graders to provide reliability and intercoder reliability, this project focuses on a single-person analysis of the source material.
Dependent Variable
Conceptualize & Operationalize Public Support
Conceptualization for measures of public support for the EU has not received particular
interest in the literature on the topic. An over-reliance on the measurements provided by
the Standard Eurobarometers (discussed later in this section) has led to a stalemate in new
conceptualizations of public support. For this research, public support for the EU is
intended as one single underlying predisposition for or against Europe rather than one
that is broken down based on a particular institution or policy. We can accept this
monolithic approach because of the low-information positions that many Europeans hold
towards the Union, as explored in the previous chapter. The support for the EU is then a
general orientation towards the overall project of European integration in the economic,
political, and identity-cultural spheres.
These three categories mirror the discursive frames through which NPLs’
discourse is analyzed. Analyzing public support based on these three categories leads to
uncovering which frames have been more successful in shaping the public perceptions
about the Union. The focus is on public support, therefore analyzing the predispositions
of those who do not belong to the political elite group of the country being discussed, but
rather the “masses.” This general level does not discriminate based on nationality or
citizenship status, it simply takes into consideration the general public resident in the
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country in which the NPL is operating. We expect public support to increase or decrease
in positive correlation with the positive or negative changes in the images and frames
used by NPLs.
Measures
Public support will be measured through responses to significant questions from
appropriate Standard Eurobarometers. The Eurobarometer (EB), started in 1974, is a
project of the European Commission (EC). EBs are multi-topic, pan-European surveys
carried out by independent public opinion companies that lead 1,000 face-to-face
interviews to gather attitudes towards European integration, institutions, policies, culture,
health, the economy, security, and a variety of other topics. The target population, before
EB 41.1, was the national population of any EU country aged 15 over. Since EB 41.1, the
target has been the population of any nationality of an EU member country, aged 15 years
and over, resident in any of the Member States. A new Standard EB is released twice a
year, one in the fall and one in the spring, providing the chance for a bi-annual analysis of
public support for the EU. While the EB is not a perfect system due to its institutional
bias and connection to the EC, it has been recognized academically as an appropriate tool
to gauge the feelings of Europeans towards the EU and the greater European project of
integration (Anderson and Hect 2015).
The EB provides a wealth of information that can be useful to measure public
support for the EU. Following a model similar to Anderson and Hect (2015), this research
selects a few recurring questions from the EB and analyzes the answers registered at each
significant EB in the country being studied. Recognizing that EB questions have changed

32

over the 19 years that are being analyzed, multiple questions that fit within a certain
category are selected. All questions are fielded in Standard EBs. The questions selected
are:
Identity & Cultural: questions regarding perceptions of personal identity,
nationality, sense of community.
•

Do you see yourself as...?(NATIONALITY) only, (NATIONALITY) and
European, European and (NATIONALITY), European only

Economic: questions regarding common currency, free trade, financial markets.
•

Is the respondent 'for' or 'against' a common European currency (single currency)
replacing the national currencies in all EC / EU member states

•

What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each
statement, whether you are for it or against it: a European economic and monetary
union with one single currency, the euro.

Political: questions regarding democracy, satisfaction with EU political institutions.
•

Do you have hope or fear for the EU after 1992?

•

Would you consider (your country) membership in the EU a good thing or a bad
thing?

•

I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain
institutions. Please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it: the
European Union

The recurrence of these questions across multiple EBs is useful in providing a standard
by which we can track the relative changes happening at each time frame. The
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significance of these questions is also due to their focus on personal perceptions towards
Europe, which can help in understanding what images and frames are being assimilated
by the public. The answers to these questions are generally categorized as positive,
neutral, or negative, with each one being connected to the percentage values of the
results. Recognizing that there is a significant lag in the effects of political
communication, as argued by Königslöw (2007), the Standard EBs used for the research
include the first one recorded at least 6 months after a government’s official start and the
three EBs following that one. This set-up provides consistency in the measurements
across time frames and allows for focus on the effects of each set of NPLs in their own
time frame.
Timeline
The selection of time frames is of fundamental importance to acquire significant results.
The overall timeline includes the years between 1990 and 2018.
The first time section is 1990-1991. The Maastricht Treaty was signed in early
1992 after a long-term discussion on the future of the European Community. Researching
the NPLs’ discourse and its effect on public support in the lead up to the passing of the
Treaty allows for the analysis of the frames that NPLs deployed to shape the
understanding of the future of the overall European project in the eyes of the public.
The second time period is 1996-1997. This period is significant to gather the
NPLs’ positioning on the long-term plans for the EU. For countries who have been
members since the original 1992 group (Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, France,
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Netherlands, West Germany, Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom, Greece, Portugal, and
Spain), this time period brought important debates on what Europe should look like.
The third time frame is 2001-2002. This era saw the introduction of the Euro as
the common currency in the Union, and represented a time for higher economic and
financial integration in the EU. Researching this time section provides insight into the
discourse’s effects on public support for new forms of integration at the European level.
The fourth time frame for research is 2011-2012. Countries across Europe were
implementing some form of austerity measures to tackle the economic and financial
issues of the Great Recession, and the Greece-EU relations became of particular interest
for NPLs across the Union. Analyzing the discourse for these years leads to an evaluation
of EU involvement in national economic affairs, which was made visible to the
electorate.
The final and most recent timespan is 2018-2019. At this time, the EU became
more commonly used in NPLs’ frames as they created images surrounding the refugee
and migrant crisis as well as the Brexit proceedings. Analyzing discourse and public
support during this time period is particularly interesting as anti-EU parties grew in
popularity during national and EP elections.
Across Time Case Study of Italy
This study utilizes the country of Italy as the case study. As one of the early promoting
states of European integration, Italy has received a significant amount of research in the
field of European studies (Lucarelli 2015; Pirro and Van Kessel 2018; Borriello and
Mazzolini 2019). Italy, due to the literature’s interest in the country, is a valuable country
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to run an initial test of the new research framework presented in this study. As an original
member of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952, the European Economic
Community in 1957, and the European Union in 1992, Italy allows for a proper analysis
of the long-term changes in NPL discourse and public support for European integration.
Studying Italian NPLs’ discourse provides a particularly poignant case study because of
the formation in 2018 of a staunchly anti-EU and populist government coalition. An indepth study of Italy helps in making sense of what is happening in Spain with VOX, in
Germany with Alternative für Deutschland, in France with the National Rally, in
Hungary with Fidesz, and many other Eurosceptic parties and leaders across the Union.
The multi-party parliamentary system of Italy is similar to that of the vast majority of EU
member states, allowing for similar dynamics to arise in different contexts.
There are other ways in which Italy represents a general case apt for this study.
Italy does not have major European institutions on its territory and does not depend upon
them: countries like Belgium and Luxembourg are heavily influenced in their support due
to their close ties to the main institutions of the Union. As explained in the previous
chapter, Italian politics were also affected by the end of the permissive consensus on the
elitarian European integration in the lead-up to the Maastricht Treaty, which started a
period of more contested ideologies and ideas on the present and the future of Europe.
This provides the chance to analyze the full arc of NPLs’ frames and public support for
the EU project.
Based on the set of standards and guidelines set up in the previous sections of this
chapter, the NPLs and EBs being analyzed for Italy are as follow:
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1. The Andreotti VI and VII governments between 1990 and 1991. The NPLs are
Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti (Christian Democracy), Achille Occhetto (Italian
Communist Party/Democratic Party of the Left). This particular time frame
requires the analysis of Occhetto during his leadership at the tail-end of the Italian
Communist Party and the birth of the new Democratic Party of the Left. The
Andreotti government is considered to be a centrist moderate force, and it was
during Andreotti’s tenure as Prime Minister that Italy officially signed the
Maastricht Treaty.
The Standard EBs analyzed are EB 34 Fall 1990, EB 35 Spring 1991, EB 36 Fall
1991, EB 37 Spring 1992.
2. The Prodi I government between 1996 and 1997. The NPLs are PM Romano
Prodi (The Olive Tree) and Silvio Berlusconi (Forza Italia). This was Prodi’s first
run as PM, at the end of which he would end up being elected as President of the
EU Commission, the European organization he led from 1999 to 2004. This time
period is of particular value for this analysis, as it is placed between the signing of
the Maastricht Treaty and the introduction of the common currency of the
European economic union. Struggles among the majority forces, together with
Berlusconi’s unstable support for the executive while at the opposition, made the
discourse particularly engaging to the public.
The Standard EBs analyzed are EB 45 Spring 1996, EB 46 Fall 1996, EB 47
Spring 1997, and EB 48 Fall 1997.
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3. The Berlusconi II government between 2001 and 2002. The NPLs are PM Silvio
Berlusconi (Forza Italia), and Piero Fassino (Democrats of the Left). This time
frame is of particular interest because it comes during the introduction and
widespread implementation of the Euro in Italy as the common currency of
Europe, and it is also the longest-lived government in post-World War II Italy.
Analyzing Berlusconi’s discourse is significant because of his long-term
involvement in Italian politics, and this time frame covers the early efforts of his
second tenure as PM after the short-lived Berlusconi I government of 1994 and
1995.
The Standard EBs analyzed are EB 55 Fall 2001, EB 56 Spring 2002, EB 57 Fall
2002, EB 58 Spring 2003.
4. The Monti I government between 2011 and 2012. The NPLs are PM Mario Monti
(Independent), and Umberto Bossi and Roberto Maroni (Northern League). This
is a time of particular interest in this case study due to the technical nature of the
Monti government. Monti was appointed PM in late 2011 to navigate Italy out of
the financial and economic crisis after the failure of previous governments to do
so. The technical government was supported by all parties except for two, one of
them being the Northern League. Bossi, the founder and long-term leader of the
independentist party the Northern League, decided to hand over leadership of the
party in early 2012, leading to a tenure for Roberto Maroni as the new face of the
party. The Monti government had to deal with heightened discussions
surrounding the role of the EU in the economic and political decisions over the
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sovereignty of Italy, especially as EU guidelines encouraged stricter austerity
measures on suffering countries.
The Standard EBs analyzed are EB 77 Spring 2012, EB 78 Fall 2012, EB 79
Spring 2013, EB 80 Fall 2013.
5. The Conte I government in 2018 and 2019. The NPLs are PM Giuseppe Conte
(Independent) and Deputy PM Salvini (Northern League) This case is of
particular interest because the 5 Star-Northern League alliance led to the first
populist anti-EU government in Italy. While holding different positions on a
variety of political and economic issues, the two parties came together and
selected Giuseppe Conte — a person with no previous political experience — as
their shared representative. This coalition was characterized by continuous infighting between the two souls of the government, making Salvini the leader of
the opposition while sitting among the executive itself, leaving external parties
struggling to be part of the public political arena. The appointment of an
independent such as Conte also led to the PM walking a fine political line
between the two pillars that maintained the government alive.
The Standard EBs analyzed are EB 90 Fall 2018 and EB 91 Spring 2019.
Conclusion
This chapter has set the guidelines for the methodological approach needed to better
understand the correlation between political discourse analysis and public support for the
EU. A methodological framework based on qualitative rather than quantitative analysis
allows researchers to more deeply understand the dynamics of hegemonic EU discourse
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amongst NPLs. The time frame selection is particularly valuable in setting up future
studies that could analyze the same relation in other European countries. As previously
discussed, the choice of Italy as the first case to test this research framework is
particularly valuable, and sets the standards for future case studies. After careful corpus
and data collection, this study now turns to the analysis of the NPLs’ discourse and the
variations in public support for the EU.
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Chapter IV: Analysis of the Discourse and Popular Support for the European Union
After analyzing the existing literature on the topic of national political leaders’ (NPLs)
discourse and setting up a methodology that builds upon existing models of research, this
study now turns to the investigation of the correlation between NPLs' changing frames of
discourse and their effects on public support for the EU. This chapter will follow the
breakdown of time frames that was laid out in Chapter III. For each time period taken
into consideration, a brief overview of the European and Italian political contexts will be
provided to better understand the discourse being analyzed. After introducing the context,
the economic, political, and identity-cultural categories are used to analyze first the
discourse within those frames and then its effects on measures of public support. Each
section is then completed by an overall analysis of the discourse and public support
outcomes for the time frame in question. The overarching analysis of trends will be
provided in Chapter V.

1990-1991 Andreotti VI-VII (July 1989-April 1991, April 1991-June 1992)
European Context
The early 1990s were, for Italy and for the rest of the continent, a fundamental turning
point in the long history of projects of European integration. The 1987 introduction of the
Single European Act (SEA) set in motion the processes that would eventually create the
single monetary union and the common political practices that would become the
effective pillars of the 1993 foundation of the EU, the political body that replaced the
previous European Communities (EC). During the 1990-1991 biennium, NPLs were
focused on what the post-1992 Europe should look like, highlighting their plans and
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hopes for the next steps of European integration. This type of presentation is, therefore, a
perfect example of what Fairclough, Mulderring, and Wodak (2001) call imaginaries, the
discursive presentation of how things should be done and how they should be.
Italian Context
Between 1990 and 1991 Giulio Andreotti and the Christian Democracy were leading
what ended up being the last government of the so-called First Republic, before the
seismic events of Tangentopoli, the bribery scandal that led to the complete reform of the
Italian political system in 1992. Italy’s executive was comprised of the same Christian,
centrist, moderate forces that had maintained power in the country since the birth of the
Republic after World War II. As Prime Minister, Andreotti also found himself to be
leading the 1990 Italian presidency of the European Council of Ministers, which tasked
him with the planning of many of the meetings that led to the Maastricht Treaty of 1992.
The political situation of the country at this time was particularly tense, as
Andreotti actually oversaw two different governments between the beginning of 1990
and the end of 1991. In April 1991, following tensions within the government about the
handling of Italy’s involvement in the Gulf War and the lack of major institutional
reforms, the Socialist Party of Italy (one of the five major parties that made up the
government coalition) pulled its support for Andreotti, but rather than going to early
elections, then President of the Republic Francesco Cossiga charged Andreotti with
forming a new government coalition. This new coalition still included the Socialist Party
as a supporting party, keeping their alignment on the same side as the Christian
Democracy. In the meantime, opposition leader Achille Occhetto was also enduring
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significant political struggle. The Italian Communist Party was a constant opposition to
the Christian Democracy governments that Italy had experienced since World War II, and
Occhetto led the party at a particular turning point. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the
Italian Community Party found itself at a cross-road: what was once the biggest and most
popular Communist party outside of the Soviet borders, was in 1991 coming to its final
chapter, with most of its members taking the road of democratic socialism and founding
the Democratic Party of the Left, of which Occhetto would eventually become secretary
after internal struggles.
Economic Frames
Discourse
Regardless of the uncertain political circumstances in which they found themselves, both
Andreotti and Occhetto engaged with EU discourse in and outside of the parliamentary
chambers. Andreotti employs economic frames in his EU discourse to set up the
conversation around further integration. In the lead-up to 1992, Andreotti tried to justify
stricter monetary and financial policies to the Italian people, measures that were
necessary for Italy to align with the criteria of deficit and inflation needed to be ready for
the eventual switch to a common European currency — outlined in detail with Maastricht
and which would be given the name euro in 1995.
For instance, in a parliamentary address on April 17th, 1991, Andreotti highlights
the need for “any effort to realize [...] a convergence with the economies of the other
European nations”. The call for “politics of sane balances” (12/6/1990) is a key framing
of the European integration issue in Andreotti’s discourse. According to the PM, meeting
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the new European criteria will not be an easy task, but it is worth “the near perspective
rich with many other innovative developments” on the economic front (4/17/1991). This
production of meaning of a bountiful Europe that one must fight and struggle for is a
constant in Andreotti’s use of economic frames are overall positive, but they do present
Italy as needing to do more in order to truly succeed as part of the future EU. The EU is
framed as a positive goal to reach and as a chance to increase Italy’s own economic
potential.
Achille Occhetto adopts similar discursive strategies in his framing of the
economic perspective for Italy in a post-1992 Europe. Occhetto highlights the fight that
Italy has to endure at this point in time, referring to the problem of “finding ourselves at
the doorstep of Europe carrying the boulder of Italian fragility, an out-of-control public
debt” (4/5/1991). Once again, Italy is the one portrayed as being less than appropriate in
the economic realm, needing to surpass its burdens before entering the future EU as a
valuable and respected member.
Public Support
The use of economic frames proves to be particularly successful among Italians, even
with the tougher financial restrictions needed to be granted entry into the common
monetary union. To proxy the support for economic integration, this study uses the
Eurobarometer questions on the support of “a single common currency replacing the
different currencies of the Member States in five or six years’ time.” Between EB 34
(Fall 1990) and EB 37 (Spring 1992), when asked about their support of the introduction
of a single European currency, an overwhelming average of 71% of Italians declared
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themselves to be in favor of this policy, more than 15 percentage points over the EU12
average of 55% in the same time frame. Italians during this time top many of the EB
charts.
Political Frames
Discourse
Having established the importance of economic issues in the discourse, the Italian PM
utilizes this area to pivot towards political frames. Andreotti presents the project of an
integrated Europe as going “far beyond the model of a free-trade association with the
addition of partial political cooperation” (11/20/1990). Andreotti goes even further and
challenges Adam Smith’s liberal theory by saying that “the New Europe, not separated by
artificial walls, cannot be created by an invisible hand” (12/6/1990), suggesting that the
future EU will only succeed with the political will of European governments and
conscious efforts to create a unique model of supranational government. On the use of
political frames, we start to see a general trend of agreeance between Andreotti and the
main leader of the opposition at the time, Achille Occhetto. Occhetto tries to take
responsibility for the political focus on this new Union, saying that “today the European
Left has in front of itself a historical objective: to combine the values of freedom and
equality” (10/11/1990). It is firmly within the European context that Occhetto sees “the
explosive, truly revolutionary, force of democracy” (10/11/1990), which is an incredibly
positive political framing for the representative of a party that was well known for its
dedication to statism. Andreotti and Occhetto’s discourses align on their focus on making
the EU a democratic home for Europeans, giving particular focus to the European
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Parliament and the unique ability to elect its members through “direct and universal
suffrage” (Andreotti 12/6/1990).
Public Support
When asked about whether they hoped or feared 1992 and the evolution of
European integration in EB 34 and EB 37, 72% and 67% respectively said that they were
hopeful, the highest percentage among the EC12 whose averages were 61% and 55%.
Similarly, in EB 35 (Spring 1991) and EB 36 (Fall 1991), when asked about their hopeful
perceptions on the single market, 71% and 73% responded positively, in contrast with the
EC12 averages of 65% and 60% respectively, once again putting Italians at the top of the
positive charts. Italians at this point feel empowered and hopeful that Italy will play a
significant role in European politics, and that their voice will be heard thanks to the
leadership of their elected leaders of reference.
Identity-Cultural Frames
Discourse
While brief mentions of “a new European nation” (Occhetto, 2/23/1990) and “a notion of
European citizenship” (Andreotti, 12/6/1990) are present in the discourse, they are not a
recurring framing during this time period. The identity-building process is not
particularly present at this point in time. Most of the European identity that is being built
during this period is one that sits opposite from the era of conflicts across the continent
before and during Nazi-Fascism. Both Occhetto and Andreotti rebuke this type of rightwing opposition to a unified Europe. Andreotti encourages Italians and Europeans to
“abandon any autarchic nostalgia” (11/20/1990). Similarly, Occhetto applauds Italians
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because “Italians have always understood very clearly the prospective of European
supranationality” (2/23/1990). The positive framing from both Occhetto and Andreotti on
the topic of identity and culture follows along with the positive frames used in both
political and economic themes.
Public Support
While the question was not asked during EB 34, starting from EB 35, Eurobarometer
respondents were asked the following question: “do you ever think of yourself as not only
(NATIONALITY), but also European? Does this happen often, sometimes or never?”
With ideas of European citizenship being built into the conversations leading up to
Maastricht, the importance of feeling European and belonging to a transnational
community became prominent. Even given the shared positive framing of identity
provided by Andreotti and Occhetto, Italian responses to the question between EB 35 and
EB 37 recorded an 8-point fall (from 28 to 16) for “often,” while “sometimes” grew by 9
points (32 to 41) and “never” by 4 points (from 37 to 41). The results are somewhat
similar to the trends across the European Community, “often” lost 7 points (21 to 14),
while “sometimes” remained steady at 32%, and “never” increased by 7 percentage
points (from 44 to 51).
Period Analysis
The Christian Democracy and the Italian Community Party were at odds on most topics
for as long as both parties existed throughout the republican history of Italy. Finding
similarities and common frames on the topic of European integration is surprising, but
also speaks to a general and overall existing support for a stronger Europe across the
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political spectrum of elites in Italian politics at the time. The effectiveness of this type of
political framing is rooted in the fresh wounds of Nazi-Fascism, and the tragedy that
nationalisms created across the continent. Whether coming from a traditional leftist party
or a conservative liberal one, Occhetto and Andreotti present an idea of political Europe
incredibly distant from the divided, insecure, and violent one that millions of Europeans
had known as early as 45 years before.
Overall, this era of political discourse focuses on presenting the EU as the natural
and most appropriate next step in the evolution of European integration. The idea is that
the arc of European history is long, but it bends inexorably towards further integration.
An integrated Europe must move forward and far beyond economic cooperation and free
trade, but it still has to do so with popular support, which both NPLs analyzed in this
period consider important. Early in the EU history, these leaders recognize the dangers of
separating elite decisions from popular will, fearing the end of the popular consensus
which has been previously highlighted in Chapter II. These NPLs are interested in
presenting a Europe that is close to its inhabitants, not a distant and complicated system
of technocratic bureaucracies.
Most of the focus is on the positive economic frames that promote the work
leading up to the EU and the positive political frames that highlight the hopes of a
stronger European integration for the future. NPLs in this time frame are working on the
emergence and hegemonic rise of ideas of an integrated Europe that reach both other
NPLs in interested countries, but most importantly their own national population. In
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presenting a people-focused EU as the objective of the project of integration, they are
centering and valuing popular support for these processes.
methodologies of our programs” (2/23/1990).
Table IV.1:Discourse Categories. Andreotti and Occhetto, 1990-1991.
1990-1991

Economic

Political

Identity-Cultural

Andreotti

Positive

Positive

Positive

Occhetto

Positive

Positive

Positive

1996-1997 Prodi I (May 1996-October 1998)
European Context
During this time period, EU countries were working towards meeting the Maastricht
convergence criteria to join the Eurozone. These criteria, such as price stability, sound
public finances, exchange-rate stability, and long-term interests, were established in 1991
to determine which countries would be allowed to join the economic union with the
common currency known as the euro (Daniels 1993). While convergence measures were
adopted across the member states, this time period was also one during which countries
like the Czech Republic and Slovenia submitted their formal application to join the EU.
Italian Context
The ups and downs of the first Prodi government were dictated by the complicated
relationship within the government coalition, as the center-left forces of Prodi had to
balance the minority support of the Reformed Communist Party, while also considering
the support of Berlusconi’s Forza Italia whose one condition was to not have to work
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with the Communist Party itself (Parker 1997). These internal tensions had to be put
aside because Italy was tasked with meeting the economic and financial criteria
established at Maastricht — on which the future of the common European currency
depended upon. In order for Italy to align with the criteria, Prodi had to establish
financial budgets for Italy that could have cut the strong welfare state in order to bring
down inflation and please the international markets, but once again had to deal with the
internal and external inputs on such tough choices.
Economic Frames
Discourse
As introduced in the Italian context for this section, Italy was once again in a tense
situation in its relationship to the European Union. Prodi does not shy away from
admitting to the toughness of the situation that Italy finds itself in, admitting that “the
price is high, but all Italians want to pay it” (9/22/1996). Prodi presents both his political
future and - most importantly - the future of Italy to the ability of the country to fully join
the economic and monetary union outlined by the Maastricht Treaty. With the statement
“I have bound my destiny to that of the Euro” (11/21/1996), Prodi presents the issue with
particular urgency, further suggesting that “remaining out [of the monetary union] would
be the economic ruin of Italy” (9/25/1996). Prodi’s positive economic frames paint a
picture of a vital and necessary EU with standards that Italy has to live up to make the
most out of the opportunities provided by successful European integration.
Very similarly, Berlusconi’s positive framing of the EU are also paired with a
critique of the Italian situation. According to the leader of Forza Italia, “we must solve a

50

problem that is of the whole country: aligning with the Maastricht parameters through a
financial budget that will guarantee us the entrance and permanence in Europe”
(3/2/1997). The financial distress for Italy is then worth not only the entrance but also the
permanence of Italy in the wider European project of economic integration. Aligning
with PM Prodi, Berlusconi’s frames the urgency of the financial alignment process and
its consequences on both the economic and the political level. “We have to make any
type of effort to enter [Europe] among the first ones, otherwise we will have negative
consequences on the union-based politics of Europe itself” (2/6/1997).
Popular Support
During this time period, support for European economic policies and for the introduction
of the common currency known as the euro was at historically high levels among Italian
respondents. When asked whether they supported the introduction of a single European
common currency, an average of 76% of the Italians sampled answered positively, with
Italians being at the top of the lists for positive answers in EB 45 (Fall 1996), EB 46
(Spring 1997), EB 47 (Fall 1997), and EB 48 (Spring 1998). The overwhelming positivity
of Italian answers goes well below the EU average, which in the same time frame barely
reaches 50%.
Political Frames
Discourse
Building off the positive economic framing analyzed in the previous section, Prodi
pursues positive frames in his political discourse. In his programmatic speech at the
beginning of his executive, the new PM assures that “we will be committed to the
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formation of an overall political project, starting from the economic and monetary union”
(5/22/1996). As a convinced supporter of an integrated Europe, Prodi does praise the
economic connection achieved in the Union and sees the potential for success at the
political level as well. With a recently fallen Soviet Union that had destabilized many of
the structures of the international arena that had dictated 50 years of foreign policy, Prodi
also recognizes that “a political Europe will contribute to a more efficient relationship
with the United States” (5/22/1996). Prodi’s vision for a politically integrated Union “is
about giving the EU its own foreign and security policy and stronger integration in the
sectors of justice and internal affairs” (5/22/2006). This analysis shows clear, constant,
and positive framing from PM Prodi - a NPL with a vision for the future integration and
expansion of Europe.
During this time period, Berlusconi’s opposition from the liberal right follows a
pattern of support and tension based on the problem at hand. While Berlusconi is firmly
placed as a leader of the opposition, he recognizes that the goal of joining the upcoming
monetary union in good standing is fundamental for the political future of Italy, not just
economically. This higher political calling and mission is enforced by Berlusconi as he
says that “in order for Italy to be in Europe, we will get over anything, even a
governmental majority that we do not like” (3/7/1997). This call for internal political
unity to reach for Italy’s European goals is repeated again by Berlusconi, as he clearly
sends the message that “there is an opposition that willing to be with the majority
government for the higher interest of the country” (3/7/1997). Berlusconi’s political
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framing is then positive, as he understands and shares with the public the need for
common political action for Italy to be successful in Europe.
Public Support
When asked whether they thought that membership in the EU was a “good thing” or a
“bad thing,” the responses of Italians were once again particularly positive when
compared to the EU average. Despite a drop between EB 45, when 75% of Italian
respondents responded positively, and EB 46, when 68% had positive answers, the
number remains high through EB 47 (62%) and EB 48 (back up to 69%). During the
same time period, the EU average remains constant around 47%. So while Italian
respondents seem to grow somewhat weary of EU membership, they are still
overwhelmingly positive when compared to the responses of their fellow Europeans
across the Union.
Identity-Cultural Frames
Discourse
PM Prodi’s identity-cultural frames situate Italy as a fundamentally European country,
connected to its network of values and identity and inseparable from the larger
community. Similarly to Andreotti in the previous time period, Prodi establishes a
symbiotic relationship in which “not only Italy needs Europe but Europe needs Italy”
(9/25/1996). This kind of relationship is one that elevates Italy to a central position in the
European world and that of Western democracies. Prodi’s national pride in his framing is
one aimed at uniting rather than dividing, as he says that Italy is “a great nation that
Europe and the West cannot do without” (5/22/1996). In his vision for the future of his
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governmental action, laid out in May 1996, Prodi’s closing statements are on the identity
of Italy in the context of Europe and the role that the EU must have in the international
arena: “the Italy we want to bring beyond the year 2000 is fully European, integrated in a
Union that we want to be bigger and more united, and it will be able to fulfill with
authority its missions of human rights promotion and peace in the world” (5/22/1996). In
highlighting the values that a united Europe could be the global leader of, Prodi maintains
his positive framings and once again reinforces the role that Italy will play in that new
world order.
Berlusconi’s use of identity-cultural frames is limited during this time period. In
Berlusconi’s vision, “remaining outside of Europe would be a tragedy because it would
be just us, with devastating effects for our country” (3/7/1997). This kind of phrasing
suggest that consequences for Italy’s absence from an integrated Europe would go well
beyond political and economic hardship, but would directly affect the structural identity
of the country. Without being inside of the EU, Italy loses part of its meaning as a nation.
Public Support
When asked questions about identity and belonging in the EU context, the answers of
Italian respondents are once again among the highest positive percentages across member
states. In EB 45, when asked whether they felt citizens of the EU, citizens of their own
country, or citizens of their own region, the answers of Italians recorded a particularly
high 30% in the first category, 53% in the second, and 16% in the last option. Comparing
that to the respective EU averages of 16%, 61%, and 22% show a much stronger feeling
of European citizenry among Italian respondents. For EB 46 and EB 47, the question was
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slightly changed to be phrased as the following: “in the near future do you see yourself
as: (nationality) only, (nationality) and European, European and (nationality), or
European only.” The answers of Italian were still particularly positive in comparison with
EU averages. Averaging the results of EB 46 and EB 47, 34% said that they only felt
Italian, 52% Italian and European, 6% European and Italian, and 5% European only. The
results remain high in comparison to the EU averages for the same answers, which were
respectively 46%, 40%, 6%, and 5%.
Period Analysis
The calls for political unity during this time period are clearly reflected in the shared
messaging that Prodi and Berlusconi promote. The internal differences between parties
are temporarily put on the sidelines to guarantee the continuation and promotion of
processes of European integration that favor Italy and the Italian people. The PM and the
opposition leader both frame the EU as a sort of higher call of politics, that goes well
beyond the electoral contest. The sense of urgency in preparation for the introduction of
the common currency is also clear in the discursive framing of both leaders, as they share
the messaging of an absolute need to not be left behind while the processes of further
economic integration keep moving forward across the continent.
Table IV.2:Discourse Categories. Prodi and Berlusconi, 1996-1997.
1996-1997

Economic

Political

Identity-Cultural

Prodi

Positive

Positive

Positive

Berlusconi

Positive

Positive

Positive
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Berlusconi II 2001-2002 (June 2001-April 2005)
European Context
During this period, the EU was working on the implementation of the euro as the
common currency across the monetary union, while also looking towards the future
Eastern enlargement of 2004 and early talks of a shared EU Constitution to consolidate
many of the European treaties into one single document adopted by the whole
community. The euro was still in its early phases and it was too early to judge whether or
not it was a success, and talks of financial convergence were left to the past.
Italian Context
The 2001-2002 biennium represents the start of the second Berlusconi government. After
a brief 8-month executive between 1994 and 1995, this second governmental experience
would eventually be the longest-tenured government of Italian history after the wars.
Berlusconi’s alliance with the National Alliance and the Northern League allowed for a
strong majority government that lasted for almost four years (Blondel et al. 2002). The
leader of the opposition during this time was Piero Fassino, who was recently elected as
secretary of the Democrats of the Left, the party that followed the short-lived experience
of the Democratic Party of the Left. The Democrats of the Left would ally themselves
with other parties of the center-left, forming the electoral alliance of the Olive Tree until
2005. Fassino was particularly critical of Berlusconi, as he often called out the PM for
presenting positive frames of Europe but not following up with clear actions.
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Economic Frames
Discourse
In his outlining of his executive’s foreign and European policy, Berlusconi presents the
common currency as an incredible success for all of Europe. In this instance, the PM says
that “the euro works - this is a beautiful and uncontested truth - and the currency is
already a popular symbol for the citizens of the continent” (1/14/2002). From Berlusconi,
the use of the Italian term “popolare” does not directly translate to the English word
“popular” as something with popularity, but more aptly translates to “a symbol of and for
the people.” Berlusconi’s economic frame is then positive, and he does set the euro as not
an imposition from higher European powers, but rather as a currency and a decision
belonging to the people of Europe, including Italians.
Fassino’s economic frames are focused on claiming many of the victories of
European economic integration under the banner of the center-left: “The years in which
the center-left coalition governed were those in which we set and realized the policy of
convergence that brought the lira into the euro” (1/14/2002). The success of the financial
convergence of the Italian economy to enter the euro was not a given for Italy, as it was
discussed in earlier sections of the chapter, and Fassino’s positive economic frames help
in sharing the value of this political effort from the parties of the center-left coalition.
Fassino continues using positive economic frames to center the value of Italy in the
European project by saying that “having brought the lira into the euro did not simply
mean rightfully respecting an essential interest of the Italian economy, but it also
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represented the occasion to show that Italy could be a credible and trustworthy country,
capable of respecting the European criteria like other countries” (1/14/2002).
Public Support
When asked whether they were for or against the euro as the single currency of the EU,
Italians respondents had overwhelmingly positive answers. In EB 55 (Fall 2001), 83% of
Italians said that they were for the euro, the highest positive answers in the Union and
incredibly higher than the EU average of 59%. Between responses in EB 56 (Spring
2002), EB 57 (Fall 2002), and EB 58 (Spring 2003), the Eurobarometer answers do show
signs of fluctuation, as positive answers go from 79% to 87%, and back down to 76%.
The inability to highlight a specific downward or upward trend does not allow to
establish a specific effect of the economic discourse on public support in terms of
economic frames.
Political Frames
Discourse
PM Berlusconi’s political discourse over this time period spans a variety of topics, in line
with positive political frames but also imagining future developments of the EU that not
many other contemporary leaders particularly agreed with. In his confirmation speech in
front of Parliament, Berlusconi confirms right away that “the government has highlighted
the continuity of the foreign policy line that it intends to strengthen with a more incisive
effort for the construction of Europe and its future” (6/18/2001). Six years removed from
his first executive between 1994 and 1995, Berlusconi reassures the Italian public that the
work that had been done since by the center-left governments would not be erased, but
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his task would be to embrace those political frames and strengthen them. Berlusconi’s
pro-EU efforts are, according to the PM, “certain to guarantee the national interests”
(6/18/2001) of Italy, and he positions himself as a strong leader in Europe when he says
that “I am protagonist of all European meetings; there is a sense of great consideration,
cordiality, and friendship” (10/26/2001).
Following the September 11th, 2001, attacks on the New York City’s World
Trade Center and the Pentagon building in Washington, D.C., the rampant talks of war in
the US and in Europe seep into the political discourse of PM Berlusconi. In recognizing
the potential escalation towards war, Berlusconi reminds the Italian public and his
political peers across Europe that “only the union of our various countries and answering
questions as one Europe can give us a political role and importance in the international
arena” (10/26/2001). In valuing multilateral diplomacy and decision-making processes,
while at the same time recognizing the particular importance of the US in the
international arena, the Italian PM suggests that a strong and united EU has the ability to
say to the Americans “here we are, this is Europe” (1/20/2002). The increased unity in
external policy for EU, according to Berlusconi, should also lead to “the creation of a
single army that integrates the various national components [if] Europe wants to be
incisive” (10/1/2002).
Rather than focusing on the potential for political change of the Union, Fassino’s
positive political frames highlight the contemporary successes and political prowess of
the EU. In reminding the Italian public of the efforts of the European Parliament, the
Commission, and many of the other EU bodies, Fassino says that “Europe is already a
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political subject! Europe already has sovereignty and its own structures” (1/14/2002).
Furthermore, similarly to his framing of economics, Fassino claims the political
integration successes of the past few years for the center-left governments that preceded
when he says that “the years of the center-left were those in which we brought Italy in the
system of free movement of Schengen, from which we were initially sidelined”
(1/14/2002). The positive framing in this case works both ways, towards the EU and
towards the work of the center-left government coalition.
Public Support
The trend of support for EU membership during this time period is a generally upward
trend. Between EB 55, EB 56, and 57, the “good thing” answers are set at 57%, 64%, and
69% respectively, compared to the average answer of 51% across the EU. These answers
are in line with what the latter data from the previous time frame indicated in terms of
political support, where the last data point from EB 48 was a positive answer at 69%.
Identity-Cultural Frames
Discourse
The identity-cultural frames used by Berlusconi focus mostly on what future Europe
could look like. While talks about the 2004 Eastern enlargement of the EU were still
ongoing with countries like Estonia and the Czech Republic, Berlusconi foresees “a
strong and big Europe, not just reaching 25 or 27 member states, but incorporating, when
it will be possible, even Russia” (1/20/2002). The annexation of Russia into the Union is
a recurring topic in Berlusconi’s discourse as he suggests again that bringing in the
Eurasian giant is necessary “to make the EU not only an economic power, but a political
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and military one, that could share with the US the goal of guaranteeing peace, security,
and wellbeing to the whole world” (4/14/2002). The focus on the values of peace,
security, and wellbeing enumerated by Berlusconi suggests that Russia shares those same
ideals and that the identity of Russia is inherently European and Western. This peculiar
discourse from Berlusconi might have been influenced by Berlusconi’s strong friendship
with Russian President Vladimir Putin, and no other political leader in this time period
(or since) has pursued this goal.
Berlusconi argues that “the last obstacles to the EU enlargement have fallen” and
therefore sees “in front of us the historical responsibility to unify the continent under
democracy and liberty, after the two totalitarianisms of Nazism and Communism and
after the division of the post-war period” (6/18/2001). The values of democracy and
liberty, according to Berlusconi, are the foundation of European identity - which he
contrasts with the totalitarian regimes of the 20th century.
Fassino highlights the tension between the talking points and the actions of
previous Italian governments and how that has contributed to building a particular image
of Italy over time in the European arena. Fassino does agree that “Italy has always been a
country seen in Europe as a country that is Europeanist and European” (1/14/2002), but
he does admit that “the contradiction between what we said we wanted to be and what we
were was often brought up” (1/14/2002). Fassino’s framing of Europe is positive, but
clearly suggests the need for Italian politicians to be doing better on keeping up with its
promises. The Democrats of the Left’s leader encourages his political peers to do better
because “many parts of Italian society, now more than ever, live, in their daily lives, the
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European dimension as an economic, social, and cultural dimension in which they make,
on a daily basis, their own choices” (1/14/2002). The identity of Italians as fundamentally
European, for Fassino, has evolved in such a way that the experience of Europe is a
tangible part of the daily livelihoods of Italians.
Public Support
Considering the recurring Eurobarometer question on European and national identity,
Italian respondents are still prominently at the top of the positive charts during this time
period. Those responding that they felt “Italian only” had a significant drop from 31%
during EB 56 to 20% and 22% in EB 57 and EB 58 respectively. The “Italian and
European” response gained 20 percentage points in the same time period, from 45% (EB
56) of answers to 65% for both EB 57 and 58. This gain in dual feeling of identity, with
the nationality still taking the higher value, did also decrease the total of the “European
and Italian” and “European only” responses, which went from a total share of 30% in EB
56 to a total of 13% in EB 57 and 11% in EB 58.
Period Analysis
The tensions between Berlusconi and Fassino during this time period are mostly focused
on internal politics and claiming ownership over some of the successes of Italy in the
European realm, but the discursive frames of both NPLs remain positive — even if they
do cover different topics between each other. Fassino does attack Berlusconi’s pro-EU
claims, arguing that the PM does not actually believe and will not act upon those ideas he
is sharing with the public, but the focus of this research is on the analysis of the discourse
presented by the NPLs, not the implementation of said ideals, values, and projects.
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Table IV.3:Discourse Categories. Berlusconi and Fassino, 2001-2002.
2001 - 2002

Economic

Political

Identity-Cultural

Berlusconi

Positive

Positive

Positive

Fassino

Positive

Positive

Positive

2011-2012 Monti I (November 2011-April 2013)
European Context
The 2011-2012 biennium was a particularly tough one at the European level. European
governance, including the European Central Bank and the European Commission, was
forced to deal with the dire economic and political situation of Greece and other
struggling EU countries such as Spain, Ireland, and Italy itself. The Greek debt crisis
represented a danger to the entire eurozone and the functioning of the whole EU as an
institution (Zahariadis 2012). Pressures from European institutions led to widespread
austerity policies across the struggling member states, suggesting policies that would help
ameliorate the deficit while also protecting the interest of banks and financial
institutions.
Italian Context
The Italian political situation during this time period was a direct reflection of the
European context that was just analyzed. Between 2011 and 2012, the Italian executive
was led by Mario Monti — economist, former European Commissioner, and Bocconi
University’s former professor and president. While the case of Monti is not unique in
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Italian political history, the selection of a non-elected leader for the role of Prime
Minister was a particularly touchy subject in the political arena and amongst the public:
at a time when trust towards politicians and institutions was struggling across the country,
President Napolitano’s choice to assign the government’s formation to Monti was a
signal to higher European powers that Italy would fall in line with the policies that were
necessary to stay afloat in that time of crisis (Giannetti 2012).
Particularly difficult for this period is the analysis of opposition discourse. Given
the urgency felt among political elites for the success of the Monti-led technical
executive, every single parliamentary group except the Northern League was supporting
the government. At this time, the League did not hold many seats in the Parliament and
was going through a significant change of leadership that made them less active in the
political arena (Del Palacio Martin 2015). While minor interventions from leaders like
Berlusconi were present, they tended to align with the discourse framed by Monti. To
properly cover this time frame, both Umberto Bossi and Roberto Maroni are taken into
consideration. Bossi led the Northern League from its inception in 1991 to 2012, when he
resigned from the party’s leadership following a corruption scandal, which prompted the
rise to leadership of former Interior Minister Maroni.
Economic Frames
Discourse
The dire economic conditions of Italy were the reason behind the existence of the Monti
government. Monti, as a non-elected leader, found himself between the economic
requests of the EU and the fears of Italians dealing with a struggling economy. Monti
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does not hide the inevitability of the “sacrifices needed to reduce the debt and restart
economic growth” but also promises that “they will have to be equitable” (11/17/2011).
Monti’s messaging and framing remain consistent throughout his tenure as PM, and he
encourages other countries to abide by the same economic and financial rules that Italy is
living by. Monti has a strong condemnation for those European leaders who do not
follow the plans set in place by the EU: “in violating the promises of balance strictness or
by pushing the needed reforms, national leaders not only have fooled their partners but
also their own peoples” (2/15/2012). The euro as a common currency remains central to
Monti’s vision of a shared Europe, and he goes as far as saying that “if we were to
compare Europe to a cathedral, then the euro would be its most perfect spire to date”
(8/6/2012). Monti also recognizes the importance of working for the unity of the
eurozone saying that preventing the break up of the common currency “is still possible,
but it isn’t just going to fall out of the sky” (8/6/2012). Monti’s economic framing is
overall positive: while he understands the toughness of the situation and does not hide it
from the Italian public, Monti still highlights the value and potential for economic
development that come from respecting and honoring the EU guidelines on debt in order
to remain outstanding members of the European monetary and economic community.
The use of economic frames from the leaders of the Northern League follows the
independentist and regionalistic framework that the party still followed during this time
period. In creating a North-South separation among the regions and areas of Italy,
Roberto Maroni suggests that “the South is like Greece and needs another currency. They
can not afford the euro” (10/2/2012). On the other hand, he frames the North as a
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fundamentally European region, in saying that “Lombardy and the North can afford the
euro. I want it in Milan, because here we are in Europe” (10/2/2012). In this case, Maroni
is constructing a case for regional Europe that will be analyzed in the following section,
but with regards to the economic frames connected to the use of the euro, his framing
must be considered negative, because it provides a vision of a Europe that is vastly
different (and in direct opposition to) the current state of the EU at this time.
Public Support
Even through this period of economic hardships, Italians remained faithfully connected to
the euro. When asked whether they were for or against “a European economic and
monetary union with one single currency, the euro” in EBs 77 (Spring 2012), 78 (Fall
2012), 79 (Spring 2013), and 80 (Fall 2013), an average of 55% of Italian respondents
provided positive answers, a slight downward inflection from the average favorable
answer at 63% recorded between EBs 66 (Fall 2006) and 69 (Spring 2008). This data puts
Italy a few percentage points above the positive averages among all European
respondents of 52% and 61% in the respective sets of EBs. The receptiveness towards the
high value of the common currency is clear in this case, as Italians align with Premier
Monti’s vision of the euro as the center-piece of the economic union
Political Frames
Discourse
Monti builds upon the economic frames to solidify his political role and seek recognition
from the Italian people, to whom he was a “political stranger.” While remaining
supportive of the project of European integration, Monti still expresses critique towards
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some of the decision-making processes of the EU, while also claiming the spoils of
victory for the multilateral work that Italy leads in this biennium. The PM highlights that
“it is important to invest more political constructive energy towards economic growth”
(1/12/2012). Monti’s political frames fully play a defensive role for the EU; in a February
2012 article, Monti suggests that “no one can believe that national democracies are doing
well and that instead ‘Europe’ does not work” (2/15/2012). In Monti’s framing, the
shortcomings of national governments and the “tyranny of short-term decisions” to
appease the electorate can only be solved through EU-level decisions. In talking about the
European debt crisis, Monti strongly affirms that “the only venue in which this mission
can be guaranteed is the European Parliament” (2/15/2012), reaffirming the centrality of
the most democratic body of the Union.
Similarly to what has been presented in the discourse analysis of Andreotti during
the 1990-1991 biennium, Monti assures the electorate that Italy will have and does have
the chance to be a significant player in the European chessboard, but that can only be
achieved “if we will be able to avoid anyone considering [Italy] ‘the weakest link of
Europe’” (11/17/2011). While in tune with the European directives on financial and
economic plans, he does play into the popular feeling of an overly bureaucratic Union by
suggesting that the EU “should allow a bit more leeway to those states in the eurozone
that follow European guidelines the most closely” (8/6/2012).
Monti also provides reassurance to the Italian people by trying to reclaim a more
central role for Italy in the EU. In an interview with Der Spiegel, the leading German
newspaper, Monti suggests that “it is completely normal that the third-largest economy in
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the eurozone has now become more active when it comes to reaching consensus on
decisions facing the Union” (8/6/2012). The reciprocal need between Europe and Italy is
clear in Monti’s discourse, as he signals that “Italy must play an active role in leading
Europe back on a path of stability and growth” (12/1/2012). This self-assigned task,
presented with a sense of urgency, aims at reigniting interest in the European project
among Italians, suggesting once again hope for a better future with Italy as a leader of
further European integration.
Political frames are particularly where the challenge from the Northern League
comes into play. Umberto Bossi and Roberto Maroni, the former the founder of the
League and the latter the new leader selected in late 2011, both have strong words and
visions for what Europe should be, and they frame those very directly. Bossi presents a
fully re-imagined EU: as an independentist for Northern Italy, the League leader invites
for the creation of “a Europe of the peoples” (12/4/2011). In the original Italian speech,
the use of the world popoli clearly signals an overcoming of the current statehood of
European countries, moving towards a federation of cultural groups bound together by
history and belonging. This idea clearly remains in the political periphery, but it is a
guiding principle for the League during this time. Maroni himself maintains strong words
for the future of the EU, saying that “today Europe is in front of a crossroad: it can either
go down the road of absolutism and of an authoritarian State or it can choose the road
indicated by Bossi, of a Europe of peoples” (12/4/2011).
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Public Support
While the Italian people at this point do not fully embrace the more extreme ideas
presented by the leaders of the League, their sense of trust towards the Union hoped by
Monti, is also not fully realized. Between EB 77 and EB 80, only an average of 25% of
Italian respondents shared that they tend to trust the EU, against a staggering 59%
replying that they tended not to trust the institution as a whole. This represents a
significant drop from the average pre-crisis levels of trust in Italy which sat at 47%, with
only 33% not trust the EU. While a similar drop can be recorded in the average EU
responses between the EB 66-69 average and the EB 77-80 average, the 22 point-average
drop in Italian trust is still wider than the EU average drop of 18% (from 50% to 32%).
The assurance provided by Monti, at least during this time period, proves to be
ineffective in reaching the Italian population. Similarly, when asked about their
satisfaction with the way democracy works in the EU, an average of 55% of Italians
replied that they were not satisfied, 10 points above the average European dissatisfaction
level of 45% during the same time period that includes EB 77, 78, 79, and 80.
Identity-Cultural Frames
Discourse
As a non-elected leader coming mostly from the economic world, Monti’s use of identitycultural frames is scarce and generally built around political values and struggles of
identity among the member states of the EU. Monti recognizes that economic and
political hardships have led to tensions “showing signs of a psychological dissolution of
Europe” (8/6/2012). A failure of the European project would not simply be a political

69

disaster but the international political arena “would lose the perspective of a more
balanced world, in which Europe can better transmit its values” (11/17/2011). Monti is
also not blind to the tensions between different regions in the EU, saying that “there is a
front line between North and South [where] there are mutual prejudices” (8/6/2012).
Monti believes in the identity-building process of a united European community, but also
recognizes the economic and political obstacles that take priority during the biennium of
his executive.
Maroni’s use of identity-cultural frames falls within a separation of Italy from the
wider European context. Talking about Italy’s relationship with Europe, Maroni uses a
traditional Italian idiom, saying that it is “meglio soli che mal accompagnati”
(4/11/2011), which translates to “it is better alone than in bad company.” This framing
clearly clashes with the values of multilateralism and shared community that are central
to the experience of European integration in building a stronger EU. In the same
comment from April 2011, Maroni also insists that “the message is that Italy has to move
forward by itself. I wonder if it makes sense to remain in the EU.” This strong separatist
narrative pushed by Maroni, together with the mentions of breaking up Europe from its
current model that were analyzed in the political frames, puts Maroni’s identity-cultural
frames in a negative camp.
Public Support
Data from the EB analyzed for this period confirm the lack of strength of any identitybased attacks towards the common Union. When asked what they mostly associate with
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the EU, only 10% of responses highlight a potential loss of cultural and national identity
for Italy, data in line with the EU average of 11% during the same period.
Period Analysis
The Monti leadership represents a peculiar case in this analysis of NPLs’ discourse and
the effects on public support for the EU. As PM he qualifies for the role of NPL, and he
had some political experience at the EU level as Commissioner, but he comes from a
mostly apolitical background, not belonging to any party and not having any kind of
experience as an elected official in any capacity at the Italian national level. His
government was supported by all the major parties at the time as they were called to build
a government of national unity and pragmatism, but his discourse is simply not effective
in countering perceptions of economic and political despair, especially as Italian media
closely followed the situation of neighboring Greece. An overreliance on higher-level
politics, which Monti uses in talking about the diplomatic and multilateral
accomplishments of Italy, does not bode well with the Italian people, who seem to prefer
more tangible promises such as ones for economic prosperity in the shorter term.
The continuity of discourse between Bossi and Maroni is to be recognized. While
the leadership did change in early 2012, the engrained policies and framework that
originate from the long leadership of Bossi since the early 90s persist into the Maroni
leadership, with the two leaders presenting many of the same discursive trends as they
deploy their economic, political, and identity-cultural images of Europe and the EU. The
clear opposition to Monti’s discourse is declined in each of the frames analyzed, but the
data shows the opposition discourse to be particularly efficient in the political context:
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presenting a distant EU, not connected to the issues of Italians, and fundamentally
structured in a way that challenges the democratic representation of the Italian people
gains early signs of approval among the inhabitants of the peninsula.
Table IV.4:Discourse Categories. Monti and Bossi/Maroni, 2011-2012.
2011-2012

Economic

Political

Identity-Cultural

Monti

Positive

Positive

Positive

Bossi/Maroni

Negative

Negative

Negative

2018-2019 Conte I (June 2018-December 2019)
European Context
The last biennium under analysis follows the 2017 Leave vote on the Brexit referendum
that would eventually lead to the United Kingdom officially withdrawing from the EU.
Together with the rhetoric of the Leave campaign, Europe also struggled with the migrant
and refugee crisis in the Mediterranean and the rise of right-wing nationalist parties. An
overall rise of nationalist parties in Austria, Spain, Germany, France, and Italy led to
strong Eurosceptic sentiments across the continent, igniting many conversations on the
future of a united and stable Europe - especially on the eve of the UK’s withdrawal from
the Union.
Italian Context
The Conte I government presented a unique case in Italian and European politics, as it
was hailed as the first populist government of its kind in the European context. Giuseppe
Conte was picked as Prime Minister to lead the alliance between the 5 Star Movement, a
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populist movement that presented himself as beyond the right-left spectrum, and the
League (formerly known as Northern League), which was at this point pushing a rightwing nationalist agenda rather than the separatist ideals of its early days under the Bossi
leadership. Similarly to Mario Monti, Conte did not have previous political experience,
with the main difference that Monti led a technical government while Conte was the
leader of an explicitly political executive.
The peculiar dynamic within the government, with 5 Star and League creating a
unique populist alliance across the political spectrum, led Salvini in particular to
represent a force of opposition while still being part of the government. With the March
2018 elections that set in motion the birth of the Conte government, the 5 Stars
Movement received the highest number of votes while the League got third place
nationally. Salvini’s tactic to push against the discourse of Conte has been considered by
many commentators as a way to gather electoral support before a new round of elections
that could have followed the fall of the first Conte government.
Economic Frames
Discourse
In a time frame during which the economic crisis of the early 2010s was mostly
considered surpassed in Italy and across the continent, the use of economic frames
remains central in the EU discourse of Italian NPLs. PM Conte’s frames are quite critical
of the EU-led economic policies that member states have to respect. In his discourse,
Conte does highlight the need for a common and community-based change in the way
that Europe approaches financial policy. The recurring use of “we” suggests that Italy is
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not and should be alone in this effort. For instance, in a December 11th, 2018, speech in
front of the Italian Parliament before heading off to the December EU Summit, Conte
says that “we must move past a short-sighted economic strictness that pretends to fight
instability with measures that end up favoring it.” The PM’s refusal to accept the policies
of European austerity follows a general trend among European politicians in this time
frame. Conte’s anti-austerity framing continues throughout his premiership, as at the end
of his first term he repeats that “we can’t simply aim at financial rigor; we must
reconsider the models of development and growth that the last few have shown to be
disastrous” (8/20/2019). It is worth noticing that while the economic frames are overall
negative, the PM never contests the nature of the common economic union, and the euro
as the common currency is never challenged.
In this case, Salvini threads along the Conte’s discursive line, but double downs
on the severity of the claims against the EU, directly naming the institution rather than
maintaining a more general approach that criticizes the policy over the policy-makers. In
discussing the role of the financial and economic guidelines set by Europe, Salvini talks
about the need to “put away forever the blackmailing behavior that [Italy] had to endure
from the EU” (5/25/2019). The vision that Salvini pushes towards the Italian population
is one of a Europe that is not based on “the demented constraints on finances that have
massacred our economy” (5/25/2019). Salvini does not pull back in directly blaming the
EU for the economic difficulties of Italy, creating a clear “us vs. them” discourse in line
with the nationalistic framework adopted by the League under his leadership.
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Public Support
When asked whether they were for or against “a European economic and monetary union
with one single currency, the euro,” an average of 64% of Italian responded positively
between EB 90 (Fall 2018) and 91 (Spring 2019), slightly above the EU average of 62%.
While this question clearly does not cover fully how respondents might feel about the
economic policies that the NPLs tend to focus on, the overall support for the common
economic and monetary union engulfs personal preferences towards specific policies.
The support for this common economic scenario registered a significant increase for the
average positive answer of 55% registered across the EBs related to the Monti
government.
Political Frames
Discourse
In terms of political framing of EU processes, both Conte and Salvini follow a pattern of
suggesting the importance of remaining within the boundaries of the Union, though with
a critical eye. According to Conte, “to change Europe and give value to Italy’s action, we
must sit at the European tables and study the reports” (10/17/2019). Conte’s political
framing of the role of Italy in the EU is one that values Italy’s critical role in the politics
of the Union. Conte presents Italy as a thorn in the side of a perceived majority within the
EU pushing forward certain agendas, saying that “Italy has not given up on expressing its
opinion even when what it had to say was uncomfortable” (2/11/2019). As the PM of a
so-called populist and anti-establishment executive, Conte clarifies that “being antiestablishment and pursuing change doesn’t mean being anti-EU. We want it to become a
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Europe of the people, closer to the needs of the people” (2/11/2019). While Conte
clarifies that he is not inherently anti-EU, his political framing remains negative, coming
from a place of critique towards the EU while still believing in the overall project of
European integration.
Similarly, Salvini sees value in using European multilateralism to change the
institution of the EU itself. On September 13th, 2018, the leader of the League says that
“we are allying with other European countries to change the EU from within; if we leave,
it would be the end of hope.” In this phase, Salvini follows in the steps of former League
leader Umberto Bossi, suggesting a strong need to fundamentally change the EU
experience while still remaining part of it.
Public Support
The Italian public reacts in interesting ways to the political frames used by Conte and
Salvini during this time period. According to answers from EB 90 and EB 91, when
asked if they thought that Italy could better face the future outside of the EU, 43% and
44% of respondents agreed with the statement, against 48 and 46% of the surveyed being
in disagreement with the statement. This is particularly interesting as the data is
particularly skewed from the EU average results. In the same EBs, only an average of
30% of EU respondents agreed and 60% disagreed with the notion that their country
could better face the future outside of the Union. To sign-post just how grave the Italian
response was, the only country with a higher percentage of respondents believing in a
better future outside of the EU is the United Kingdom, with an average of 43% of
positive answers. While the NPLs do hope to work within the EU, their critical political
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framing seem to suggest to Italians that their country could be better off away from the
political pressures of the EU.
Identity-Cultural Frames
Discourse
2018-2019 is a clear turning point in the use of identity-cultural frames in the discourse
of Italian NPLs. Matteo Salvini, from his role as opposition within the government
majority, often deviates from the tracks laid out by PM Conte. Using particularly strong
and direct religious language, Salvini sets the guidelines for Italy’s action in the EU by
saying that “in Europe, we will act based on the Scriptures’ passage, the one that reminds
us that the laws are made for men and men are not made for the laws” (5/25/2018).
Salvini roots his and the government’s actions in a profoundly religious background,
blessing his own positioning towards the EU in the words of the Bible.
Salvini frames his own actions in a crusade-like fashion, putting history and
Christianity firmly on his side. In an interview leading up to the May 2019 EP elections,
the League’s leader says that “history will entrust us with the role of saving European
values - from its Judeo-christian roots to the right to work, the right to security, the right
to life” (5/25/2018). This higher call to upholding European roots is justified in the
failures of the overall project of European integration. According to Salvini, “this Union
has grown too much, and too quickly, without common roots, only with a common
currency [and] so we are working to re-establish the European spirit” (5/25/2018).
Salvini’s framing is clearly set in a negative field towards the EU, portraying it as a force
for evil that must be dealt with.
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PM Conte, on the other hand, lets his comments and framing of identity-cultural
themes fall into a critical yet supportive area with regards to the greater project of
European integration, similar to what has been analyzed in the economic and political
contexts. Conte’s main goal in this context is to frame Italy as fundamentally European
and inseparable from the EU project. In his very first speech in front of the Senate on
June 5th, 2018, Conte leads by saying that “Europe is our home, our shared home.” The
role of Italy “as a founding country” is to build “a stronger and more equitable Europe, in
which the economic and monetary union is aimed at safekeeping the needs of citizens to
balance the principles of responsibility and solidarity” (6/5/2018). Italy’s role, according
to Conte, is to work within the confines of the EU, “believing and remaining to be an
integral part of the European Union” (12/11/2018). Confirming the positive role of Italy
in the EU, Conte sets in stone that “Italy has been a protagonist in the decisive turning
points of the history of European integration” (12/11/2018). While Conte tends to be
critical in the field of economic and political frames, his positioning on the identitycultural frames remains mostly positive.
Public Support
Regardless of Salvini’s focus on the importance of Judeo-Christian roots and presenting
himself and Italy as saviors of European values and identity, only an average of 12.5% of
Italians responded to the question “What does the EU mean to you personally?” by
identifying loss of cultural identity, a number that remained in line with both the EU
average of 13% and the previous Italian average of 10.5% between EB 77 (Spring 2012)
and EB 80 (Fall 2013).
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Period Analysis
The analysis of the discourse for the Conte government, together with the international
discursive tensions provided by the Salvini opposition, provides an interesting outlook
over the dynamics of populist Eurosceptic discourse among Italian NPLs. While during
other time frames some NPLs have been directly critical of the EU in some capacity
under economic, political, and identity-cultural frames, it is important to parse out the
difference between the discursive frames of Conte as Prime Minister and lead negotiation
in the European context and Salvini, who as Ministry of the Interior holds an important
national regional but does participate as prominently as Conte in the conversations with
other leaders in the EU context. The relationship between Conte and Salvini and their
framing of the EU and European integration also help in differentiating between critical
yet constructive discourse and one that seeks to simply destroy pre-existing frames of
support.
Table IV.5:Discourse Categories. Conte and Salvini, 2018-2019.
2018-2019

Economic

Political

Identity-Cultural

Conte

Negative

Positive

Positive

Salvini

Negative

Positive

Negative
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Conclusion
This chapter provided an in-depth analysis of discourse and public support throughout the
selected time frames outlined in Chapter III. As each section focused on majority and
opposition leaders alike, what emerge are similar and contrasting discourses among said
NPLs. Using a critical discourse analysis approach, this chapter uncovered many of the
nuances of the processes of meaning construction that Italian NPLs employed between
1990 and 2019. While the EU did change over time, much of the focus of the political
elites remained on what role Italy should play in relation to the greater project of
European integration, and whether the challenges presented with that were worth
fighting. Having analyzed each of the individual time periods, the following concluding
chapter provides an overview of the results from Chapter IV, analyzing the over-arching
trends in both discourse and public support, while also suggesting avenues and areas for
future research.
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Chapter V: Conclusions
Introduction
After having carried out an in-depth analysis of national political leaders (NPLs) within
and across time frames, this chapter provides a conclusion to the research project. The
chapter begins with an overview of the results from the previous analysis, providing the
valuable long-term analysis of trends for both NPLs’ discourse and public support for the
EU. The next section consists of methodological considerations about the analytical
approaches chosen for this research, and what its limitations in practice and results were.
The chapter concludes with suggestions for future research.
Results Overview
The original hypothesis for this research project was that positive or negative changes in
discourse were going to positively or negatively affect public support for the EU. After
careful and in-depth analysis, the major trend that is highlighted is the centrality of
discursive agreeance among NPLs in a certain time frame. Rather than the individual
NPLs’ framing of the European integration, changes in public support appear to be
deeply correlated to whether majority and opposition leaders within a time frame shared
common messaging in the categories of discourse taken into consideration. It is the
changing dynamics between NPLs’ discourse that affect public support. When positive
framing appeared across economic, political, and identity-cultural categories for both
majority and opposition leaders, public support in Italy was at particularly high levels. On
the other hand, Italian public support for the EU dropped to well-below average levels in
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the cases where a NPL’s messaging was inconsistent and/or there were discrepancies
between majority and opposition leaders in any of the categories of discourse.
Table V.1:Overview of NPLs’ Discourse
Economic

Political

Identity-Cultural

Andreotti 1990-1

Positive

Positive

Positive

Occhetto 1990-1

Positive

Positive

Positive

Prodi 1996-7

Positive

Positive

Positive

Berlusconi 1996-7

Positive

Positive

Positive

Berlusconi 2001-2

Positive

Positive

Positive

Fassino 2001-2

Positive

Positive

Positive

Monti 2011-2

Positive

Positive

Positive

Bossi/Maroni 2011-2

Negative

Negative

Negative

Conte 2018-9

Negative

Positive

Positive

Salvini 2018-9

Negative

Positive

Negative

A particular trend that generates out of the analysis has to do with the positioning
of Italy relative to the project of European integration. In the earlier time frames, there is
an underlying message constant across categories and leaders: the EU is great and must
be a goal to work towards, and Italy has to better itself to match the standards of
membership for its economic, political, and cultural sake. This overall message
recognizes the shortcomings and fallacies of the Italian national system and sees in
European integration the chance to improve and get a greater economic and political
return on investment. The drastic change, which can be seen particularly in the post-crisis
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discourse, is that recent leaders have flipped this original script. In recent times, Italian
NPLs appear to be more critical of the EU, aiming at changing it from within or
drastically moving past the current project of European integration. Rather than a higher
goal to achieve, the EU comes is framed as a force dampening the potential of Italy —
and Italian NPLs are the ones with the knowledge and know-how to fix the problems they
see in the European context.
To proxy for the level of public support in the economic category, this research
used four similar questions, which all asked about support for the introduction and then
the maintaining of a single economic and monetary union with the euro as its common
currency, replacing national currencies. Whether on the terms of hope or support for the
single currency, it is clear that Italian levels of support remain significantly higher than
the EU levels until the Monti-related Eurobarometers of 2012 and 2013 (see Figure 5.1).
To proxy for the level of public support in the political category, questions of
hope, membership benefit and trust show once again a much steeper decline in Italy than
the EU average. The general level of support remains higher in Italy throughout the preMonti period, and then drops to levels that are actually lower than the EU average (see
Figure 5.2).
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Figure V.1:Public Support in the Economy Category. 1990-2019. Italy & EU average.

Figure V.2:Public Support in the Politics Category. 1990-2019. Italy & EU average.
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Figure V.3:Identity of Respondents. Italy.

Figure V.4:Identity of Respondents. EU average.

When evaluating the feeling of belonging to either their own nationality or to a
shared European identity, the differences between Italy and the EU average are
significant especially in the “(nationality)+European” category. While both “European
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only” and “European+(nationality)” remain consistent over time and across both Italy and
the EU, Italy separates itself from the EU average by having a particularly high value in
the “(nationality)+European” category (see Figure V.3 and Figure V.4). The underlying
belonging to a shared European community remains significantly higher than the EU
average throughout the Eurobarometers during which the national/European identity
question was asked in this way.
A clear understanding that arises from the analysis of this case study is the
confirmation that it is NPLs’ messaging that affects public support and not vice versa,
which was a point of contention in the literature reviewed in Chapter II. PMs Mario
Monti (2011-2012) and Giuseppe Conte (2018-2019) were two recent cases of nonelected government leaders who shaped the discourse of Italian politics with regards to
EU integration. While the Italian electoral process does not expect the PM to be chosen
by direct election, they usually are the chosen leader of whichever electoral faction
receives the majority of seats in the two chambers of the Parliament. But with Monti and
Conte in particular, the experience is that of two leaders that were chosen from outside of
the national political arena. Their discourse then does not depend upon a particular partyspecific electorate, but it does hold direct influence over the messaging received by the
public during their time of leadership.
Another piece of insight that has been gained from this research is the value of
discursive recurrence. Clear and consistent messaging from NPLs is important in order
for the public to receive and internalize those frames of understanding the EU. For some
discursive categories, the lack of recurring material from an NPL can signal that a leader
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does not particularly utilize that specific frame. Related to this question of volume of
messaging, another area that this research does not consider but should be brought in for
future consideration, is the proliferation of these messages through media systems and
channels. A recurring and consistent message is more likely to be picked up by media in
the construction of a discursive narrative, and the assumption is that those NPLs’
messages remain consistent in the time frames considered.
Overall, this study suggests that with external factors remaining mostly constant
for all EU countries, the differences in Italian public support were caused by the changing
dynamics of discourse between Italian NPLs. Events like the introduction of the euro, the
Great Recession or the refugee crisis are impacting all Europeans in some way, what
truly matters is how NPLs frame their messaging directed at the population. Perceptions
of Europe, rather than actual data or events, are what guide the popular understanding and
support for the EU and the project of greater European integration.
Implications of Findings
Given the overview of the results and trends analyzed in the previous sections, this study
can be strongly placed within the literature on the topic of elite messaging and public
support as analyzed in Chapter II. The results of the discourse analysis point towards
confirmation of the idea of permissive consensus as outline by Della Porta and Caiani
(2006) and Sanders and Toka (2013). The early phases of the EU experience were linked,
at least in the case of Italy, to NPLs’ vested interested in a stronger European integration
and the political and economic benefits it would entail. The agreeance in messaging
between Andreotti and Occhetto, Prodi and Berlusconi, and Berlusconi and Fassino,
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shows that regardless of political belonging or ideological roots, the central NPLs in these
time periods were all in favor of further European integration, and the public was
particularly receptive to their messaging. The literature points that the signing and
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty might have been the breaking point for the elite-led
process of integration, bringing the worries of the public into the conversation, but the
results from this study suggest that the public was still receptive to consistent positive
framing until the 2001-2002 time frame.
This research project also confirms the importance of focusing on the country’s
internal dynamics as the level of analysis that is the most effective in understanding the
correlation between elite political discourse and public support for the EU. Across the
speeches and interventions analyzed for the Italian NPLs selected for this study, the
recurring focus was on what would be good for Italy, how the EU would impact the
country, and which role Italians should play in the Union’s politics. The literature
suggested that the lack of a European public sphere (Della Porta and Caiani 2006, Bee at
al. 2008) and the nature of EU institutions (De Vreese et al. 2006) lead to a elite
messaging that is focused around country-level analysis rather than a EU-level approach.
Across all discursive categories (political, economic, and identity-cultural), NPLs focused
solely on presenting Italy in relation to a general sense of Europe, but without ever
embracing a sense of a shared political sphere with other specific countries in the Union.
Methodological Considerations
Having concluded and overviewed the results of the analysis carried out in the previous
chapter, methodological questions can be discussed. The first part is understanding
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whether or not the categories utilized for discourse and public support — economic,
political, and identity-cultural — have proved to be valuable for this research. While
NPLs in the 1990-1991, 1996-1997, 2001-2002, and 2006-2007 biennia were consistent
across their own discursive categories, categorical differences within the discourse of
single NPLs appear in the 2018-2019 analysis. As analyzed in the previous section, this
time period was also one in which public support for the EU dropped significantly. As
introduced in Chapter II, public support for the EU tends to be uniform, but the
increasing nuance in the contemporary discourse does justify the use of these three
categories as adapted from Pirro and Van Kessel (2012).
On the topic of analytical categories, a major point of consideration is that of the
positive-negative dichotomy utilized for this paper. This dichotomous split fails to
consider much of the spectrum over which the NPLs’ discourse can be found. Given
more time and resources and still employing the same analytical categories, future
research should build a more inclusive scale that allows for better engagement and
evaluation of what “negative” or “positive” discourse is. According to the current
methodology utilized in this research, two statements like “the European Parliament is
somewhat undemocratic” and “the EU will destroy national sovereignty and take
citizens’ rights away from them” would be equally categorized as simply negative. The
value of discourse analysis is in capturing those more subtle nuances in the context of a
wider corpus of material, and expanding the level of analysis to include more values on
the positive-negative scale would have made for a more detailed approach.
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Another interesting methodological decision relates to the difference between
direct discourse and quoted speech. To build the catalog of material for analysis (see
Appendix I), a combination of parliamentary records and newspaper articles was utilized
to find what NPLs had to say about the EU and the process of European integration.
Parliamentary addresses were a great source for material for this research, as they often
provided extensive and in-depth opportunities to analyze a significant part of the NPL’s
discourse. Interviews and newspaper articles were valuable in adding material especially
for NPLs on the opposition — particularly those working mostly outside of the House or
Senate — but they do raise the question of validity for the material gathered from those
sources. Interviews are still a valuable source of direct discourse, but quoted speech from
newspaper articles are directly determined by whatever messaging and framing the
journalist or editor wanted to provide to the readers. As journalists actively select what to
include in their articles, they are eliminating context and material that are both important
in the discussion of discourse as a whole.
Future Research
Italy represented a worthwhile first case study for this approach, given its long history in
the context of EU politics and the dramatic changes in public support over the time frame
analyzed here. Italy’s case shows that this significant drop correlates to the variation in
NPLs’ discourse over time, going from shared and consistent messaging to a more
nuanced and often disjointed framing. Taking into consideration all the methodological
limitations, future research must expand on this initial analysis by adding comparisons
with NPLs across other EU countries over the same time periods and analyzing what the
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consequences on EU public support in those states are. A longitudinal cross-country
study would give better insight into whether it is the shared majority-opposition
messaging that affects public support, providing answers to a major research puzzle that
this study uncovered.
Given the scope of analysis of this project, there was no case in which both
NPLs’s discourse was negative across the three analytical categories. Analysis was
provided for cases in which there were discrepancies either between NPLs (2011-2012)
or within the discourse of NPLs and between the two (2018-2019). Since it did not appear
as a scenario in this case study, future research should seek to understand what the effects
on public support are when both NPLs are using negative frames in their discourse about
the EU. Would an agreeance on negative framings lead to an even sharper decline in
public support, or would the levels remain similar to those with cases of disagreement
like those analyzed in this project?
A final suggestion for future research would be a more in-depth focus on the
dynamics of discourse of leaders that move in and out of executive power. This project
analyzed Silvio Berlusconi during two time periods, 1996-1997 while at the opposition
and 2001-2002 as Prime Minister, but he maintained positive messaging in all categories
in both time frames. Future analysis could focus on if and how NPLs’ discourse changes
when occupying executive positions in the government. Given the nature of multilateral
diplomacy as the core of EU politics, one might expect that NPLs with negative
messaging while at the opposition might try to reconsider or reframe the issues to more
moderate positions when in a ministerial role.
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Conclusion
In conclusion, this study represents the first endeavor into the analysis of the evolution of
EU discourse and its effects on public support over time. While acknowledging the
methodological limitations presented in the previous section of this chapter, the results of
this study show that the initial assumption of changes in elite messaging affecting public
support to be true. This single case study has allowed for the initial unraveling of the
complicated case of Italy, whose population has gone from leading supporters of
European integration to often sceptic members of the European community. As the EU
continues to grow and evolve in its political, economic, and cultural declinations, NPLs
must consider their vital role in framing the Union as either the higher calling or a major
obstacle for their countries. As long as ideological disagreements are communicated
through inconsistent and clashing discursive frames, public support for the greater project
of European integration cannot be expected to increase. This research model has exposed
that the dynamics of national politics are fundamental for understanding what the
population will believe in, as they look to NPLs for guidance in their informed decisions.
In consideration of a lack of a shared European public sphere remains a constant in the
EU, this model can be used to analyze the correlation between NPLs’ discourse and
public support in other countries of the Union, creating a stronger network of knowledge
on this important topic.
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